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CAPTURE THEORY AND THE COURTS: 1967-1983
THOMAS W.

MERRILL*

The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")' is a framework statute, not a complete code. Its central provisions are rather spare, and a
number of important questions are not covered at all. It comes as no
surprise, therefore, that the judicial gloss on the APA has taken on a
large significance over time. It should also come as no surprise that
this interpretative mantle has assumed a different shape with different
generations of judges. In this respect, our experience with the APA
parallels that with the Constitution. Occasionally there is a feint in
2
the direction of enforcing the "original understanding" of the APA.
But the dominant trend has been toward the creation of a kind of
common law of administrative procedure, with each generation of
judges reworking the law in accordance with its perception of the "felt
'3
necessities of the time."
With the benefit of a half century of hindsight, undoubtedly the
most remarkable period of administrative common-lawmaking was
the one that started in the late 1960s and lasted until the early 1980s.
To be more precise, although artificially so, it was the period bracketed by Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner4 in 1967-announcing a
strong presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action-and
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n. v. State Farm Mutual5 in 1983ratifying the "hard look" doctrine developed by the courts of appeals
in the preceding decade. During this window of about 16 years, the
federal courts significantly transformed the law of administrative procedure. In addition to the presumption in favor of judicial review and
* John Paul Stevens Professor of Law, Northwestern University. In addition to those who
offered commentary and questions at the symposium, my thanks to Steve Calabresi, Tony
D'Amato, Marshall Shapo, Ray Solomon and the participants at a Northwestern University
School of Law faculty workshop for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
2. See Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512
U.S. 267,272 (1994) (meaning of "burden of proof" in APA determined by "ordinary meaning of
'burden of proof' in 1946, the year the APA was enacted"); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 523 (1978) (APA was "a legislative enactment which settled 'long-continued and hard-fought contentions, and enacts a formula
upon which opposing social and political forces have come to rest."') (citation omitted).
3.

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Howe ed. 1963, originally published

1881).
4. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
5. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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the hard look doctrine, some of the prominent innovations of this era
include: the expansion of standing to include competitors and public
interest groups; 6 the rise (and fall) of "procedural review" in complex
rulemaking cases;7 the recognition of due process hearing rights in a

wide range of informal administrative contexts; 8 the creation of an action for damages against federal agents who commit violations of the
Constitution; 9 the articulation of a broad preference for disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"); 10 and the judicial
interpretation of the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") as
imposing a powerful general constraint on agency actions affecting the
environment.11
The most obvious common theme in these innovations is expanded judicial oversight and control of agency action. What we see
during this period, in effect, is a general shift in authority over regulatory policy from agencies to courts. One is tempted to go farther, and
say that the apparent motivation for this shift was to give "public interest" groups greater leverage over agency policy. But without denying that a desire to promote progressive causes may have influenced
some of these decisions, the reforms were in fact poorly designed to
achieve such a targeted result. Each reform was articulated at a level
of generality that permitted a wide variety of groups, including not
just public interest intervenors but also regulated businesses and their
competitors, to enlist the aid of the courts in their struggles with
agency regulators. Judged by what the reforms actually accomplished,
the common thread is simply a shift in power from the agencies to the
courts.
If we can agree, at least provisionally, that this was the central
thrust of administrative common law from 1967 to 1983, then how
does this era differ from what went before and what came after? It is
difficult to generalize in the same way about the twenty years that
preceded the period in question and the nearly fifteen years that have
followed. Neither of the book end periods has the same thematic clarity as the middle era.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 143-48.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 240-58.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 259-76.
9. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
395 (1971).
10. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 136-37 (1975); EPA v. Mink, 410
U.S. 73, 79-80 (1973).
11. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n,
449 F.2d 1109, 1111-12, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

CAPTURE THEORY AND THE COURTS: 1967-1983

On the whole, however, the judicial doctrines that played a prominent role during the first twenty years under the APA tended to be
ones that enhanced (or at least preserved) the power of the agencies
relative to the courts. Illustrations would include the practice of deferring to agency interpretations of law, arguably outlawed by the
APA12 but rescued and perpetuated in the 1946-1966 era; 13 adoption
of a generally deferential understanding of the substantial evidence
standard of review; 14 widespread invocation of the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies; 15 and the
expansion of antitrust immunities so as to favor positive regulation
6
over judicial liability rules.'
Characterization of the post-1983 era is even more problematic, if
only because it is always difficult to perceive patterns or generalities in
periods close to one's own. One thing, however, is clear: judicial innovations that would expand the authority of the courts at the expense
of agencies have almost entirely disappeared. To the contrary, there
has been a significant retrenchment from the outer perimeter of judicial authority established during the period of innovation. The most
dramatic retreat came with the Supreme Court's Vermont Yankee decision, 17 which ended the lower courts' practice of imposing procedures on agency rulemaking beyond the Section 553 minimum. (This
of course occurred within the time frame that I have adopted for the
period of innovation, thus underscoring the imprecision of these
18
dates.) Additional retrenchments include: the Chevron doctrine,
which is generally thought to have shifted authority from courts to
agencies in the interpretation of law; new restrictions in the law of
standing; 19 and the development of important exceptions to the pre20
sumption in favor of judicial review.
Yet most of the innovations spawned during the 1967-1983 period
have endured. For example, we still have a general presumption in
favor of judicial review, the hard look doctrine, a presumption of dis12. See infra text accompanying notes 204-06.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 207-11.
14. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956) (questions of tariff
interpretation should be submitted to the agency when national transportation policy implicated); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938) (agency action outside its
jurisdiction may not be enjoined prior to exhaustion of remedies before the agency).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 277-96.
17. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 435 U.S. 519
(1978).
18. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 149-56.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 168-78.
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closure under FOIA, NEPA review of major federal actions affecting
the environment, and so forth. On balance, perhaps the most accurate
way to characterize the modern era is that there is no clearly discernible tilt either toward agencies (as arguably existed during the first two

decades after the adoption of the APA) or toward courts (as happened during the middle period). The modern judiciary appears to

have no strong commitments-or at least no consistently held strong
commitments-either to the autonomy of the administrative state or
to judicial control of the administrative state. We are, in effect, in a

kind of holding pattern. Administrative law has become (or has become again) a rather dull subject, at least compared to the heady days
of 1967-1983.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an explanation for this
historical pattern, and especially for the emergence and then the re-

cession of activist judicial control of administrative action that prevailed during the middle years under the APA. There is widespread
agreement among administrative law scholars that the administrative
common law of the recent era has assumed a different character from
that of the 1967-1983 period. Commentators have given various names

to this phenomenon, such as "neoclassical revival. ' 21 But there is very
little consensus about what has caused this latest turn by the courts,
22
other than that it is a reaction to the excesses of the prior period.
My attempt to account for these changes is not intended to provide a
balanced or complete explanation, such as one would expect to find in
a work of intellectual history. Instead, I will set forth a fairly reduc-

tionistic theory, in the hope that this will prove more provocative and
23
will perhaps stimulate amplifying or alternative explanations.

21. See generally Keith Werhan, The NeoclassicalRevival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN.
L. REV. 567 (1992) (divding modem administrative law into three periods-the "classical period," the "interest representation" period, and the "neoclassical revival"). Werhan's account
closely parallels the historical typology presented here.
22. See id. at 620.
23. Several additional factors would surely receive emphasis in a more complete account.
One would be the rise of the "public interest" bar in the 1960s. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal
Regulation in HistoricalPerspective,38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1272-1278 (1986). Another would be
the emergence of the environmental movement around 1970. Courts responded to the environmental movement with great enthusiasm, and many of the procedural innovations of the middle
period were justified in part based on the need to protect what were perceived to be the uniquely
important interests at stake in such cases. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus,
478 F.2d 615, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Sometime around 1976 the Supreme Court's environmental
ardor cooled, see Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, JudicialActivism and Restraint in the
Supreme Court's Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343, 358-362 (1989), and this
may have contributed to the shift toward greater restraint in ensuing years.
My colleague Steve Calabresi has also suggested that the pattern of party control of different branches of government may have played a role in the historical pattern I describe. The
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My thesis, which is set forth more fully in Part I, is that the courts'
assertiveness during the period from roughly 1967 to 1983 can be explained by judicial disenchantment with the idea of policymaking by
expert and nonpolitical elites. There was during this period no loss of
faith in activist government. But a key instrumentality of activist government-the administrative agency-came to be regarded as suffering from pathologies not shared by other governmental institutions
such as legislatures or courts. The principal pathology emphasized
during these years was "capture," meaning that agencies were regarded as being uniquely susceptible to domination by the industry
they were charged with regulating. Starting in the late 1960s, many
federal judges became convinced that agencies were prone to capture
and related defects and-more importantly-that they were in a position to do something about it. In particular, these judges thought that
by changing the procedural rules that govern agency decisionmaking
and by engaging in more aggressive review of agency decisions they
could force agencies to open their doors-and their minds-to formerly unrepresented points of view, with the result that capture would
be eliminated or at least reduced.
Why then did this period of judicial activism fizzle out as the
1980s wore on? I will suggest that the reasons we do not see a similar
pattern of activism in the most recent period are very different from
those of the pre-1967 period. The first two decades under the APA
were years when the "public interest" theory of the administrative
state associated with the New Deal still held considerable sway over
the public and the judicial imagination. Given the prevalence of this
attitude, it was only natural that courts would look benignly on agency
authority and autonomy, and would adopt a generally deferential
stance toward agency decisionmaking.
period of activism in administrative law was one in which Congress was controlled by Democrats
and the judiciary (especially the D.C. Circuit) by Democratic appointees, while the executive
branch was mostly in Republican hands (Nixon and Ford). This might explain the D.C. Circuit's
vigorous scrutiny of administrative action during this period, without any concomitant questioning of the legislative branch. By the mid-1980s, the pattern had changed to one in which Congress remained in the hands of the Democrats, but now both the executive (Reagan and Bush)
and the judiciary (especially the Supreme Court, where there had been no Democratic appointments since 1968) were Republican. This arguably translated into a Supreme Court repudiation
of the D.C. Circuit and a movement toward greater deference toward agencies, along with a new
note of judicial skepticism about Congress. Professor Calabresi's explanation would suggest, of
course, that we should see another burst of activism in administrative common law beginning
around 1994, when the White House was in Democratic hands (Clinton) but the courts and now
the Congress were both Republican. Although I have detected no signs of such renewed activism so far, it is probably too early to tell for sure.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1039

The decline of judicial assertiveness in the recent period, and the
partial return of authority and autonomy to agencies, I will argue, cannot be considered in any sense a revival of the public interest conception of the administrative state, or a rehabilitation of administrative
agencies as institutions in the eyes of the judiciary. Rather, it is a
product of a deeper and more generalized pessimism about the administrative state, and in particular, of a spreading disenchantment
with all forms of activist government. I will refer to this shift in attitudes as a movement toward a "public choice" conception of the administrative state, although I hasten to add that I do not mean to
imply that (most) judges have either studied or become practitioners
of formal public choice theory. By public choice conception of the
administrative state, I simply mean a conception that is skeptical
about the capacity of any governmental institution to serve the public
interest, primarily because all governmental institutions-agencies,
legislatures, the White House, and even the courts-are subject to manipulation by organized groups, and hence cannot be regarded as dispassionate guardians of the public interest.
What we see in the contemporary era of administrative common
law, therefore, is not so much the substitution of one model of activist
government for another, but rather a general loss of faith in governmental ordering of social and economic life. This, I think, accounts
for the general revival of formalism in administrative law,2 4 as reflected in the turn to textualism and away from legislative purpose
under the Chevron doctrine, 25 the infusion of common law concepts
into the law of standing and reviewability, 26 and the insistence on following old doctrines of primary jurisdiction even when they are disavowed by the agency. 27 The contemporary attitude seems to be that
if nothing good can be expected to come from government, then perhaps the best we can do is to avoid wasting resources debating the
rules. Thus, modern administrative common law often seems committed to making the rules as simple, mechanical, and common-law like
as possible, in the hope that this will minimize the temptation to seek
strategic advantage through further changes in the rules, and the
deadweight loss that such a process of "rule churning" likely entails.
24. Werhan, supra note 21, at 568.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 220-38.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 138-78.
27. See Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116 (1990) (ICC lacks
authority to modify judicially created filed rate doctrine); cf MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T
Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994) (FCC lacks authority to modify statutory tariff filing requirements long
identified by courts as being fundamental to Act).
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Everyone is entitled to his or her own theory of history; the problem comes in persuading others that it has merit. After setting forth
my thesis in somewhat greater detail in Part I, I will attempt to adduce
evidentiary support for the two halves of the thesis: first, that each of
the three eras I have delineated can be characterized as being "dominated" by a different conception of the administrative state; second,
that the administrative common law of each era is a product of these
conceptions.
The first half of the thesis, considered more fully in Part II, is
difficult if not impossible to prove. It is undoubtedly true, for example, that each of the three strands of thinking I have identified-the
public interest, capture theory, and public choice conceptions-can be
found in the academic and judicial writing of each of the three eras.
Thus, any attempt to point to particular writings from any era as proof
that a particular attitude was "dominant" in that era is subject to the
charge of selection bias. Nevertheless, I will try to show, primarily by
focusing on some especially influential academic and judicial writings,
that there is reason to believe this half of my thesis is plausible.
The second half of the thesis, that these changing conceptions of
the administrative state can account for the changes in administrative
common law, is the subject of Part III. Here, I trace in longitudinal
fashion a number of judicial doctrines in an effort to show a common
pattern: judicial deference to agency processes from 1946 to 1967,
greater judicial control and oversight from 1967 to 1983, and a shift
backward in some degree toward agency autonomy or at least to less
judicial intrusion after 1983. I will try to show how the forms of enhanced judicial control and oversight that emerged during the 19671983 period were consistent with what a preoccupation with agency
pathology, especially agency capture by industry, would indicate is appropriate. And I will suggest that the retrenchment in administrative
law in the most recent period contains elements consistent with what a
pessimistic public choice theory would produce. The doctrinal shifts
catalogued in Part III are ones that virtually all observers would agree
have taken place; the fact that the change in attitudes toward the administrative state I have hypothesized can explain these shifts provides inferential support that the thesis is correct.
I will close with some thoughts about the implications of my historical thesis for some current controversies in administrative law, and
for the future of administrative law.
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THE THESIS

My explanation for the shifts in judicial implementation of the
APA over the last fifty years is based on changes in judicial ideology.
By "ideology," I do not mean ideology in the narrow sense of Republicans versus Democrats or liberals versus conservatives, but rather
ideology in the more fundamental sense of changes in attitudes about
the role of administrative agencies in a system of democratic government. I do not rule out the possibility that these changes in attitudes
28
may, in turn, reflect some deeper shift in economic and social forces.
For the moment at least, I have no theory to offer on that front. So I
will take changes in judicial ideology, understood to mean changes in
attitudes toward the administrative state, as my primary datum and
explanatory variable.
A number of observers have perceived that public attitudes toward the administrative state have changed dramatically between
1946 and the present. 29 The usual characterization of this change is a
shift from a "public interest" conception of the administrative state to
the belief that the administrative state largely serves the ends of narrow "interest groups."' 30 Thus, the standard historical account hypothesizes a more-or-less linear evolution in the post-World War II era
from public optimism to pessimism about the central tendencies of
administrative government.
I do not quarrel with this characterization, if taken as two snapshots of public opinion, one from the early 1950s, the other from the
late 1990s. But the problem with hypothesizing such a linear progression from the one set of attitudes to the other is that it cannot account
for the perceived pattern of judicial implementation of the APA, and
28. Cf Theodore J. Lowi, The State in PoliticalScience: How We Became What We Study,
86 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1, 6 (1992) (suggesting that the rise of public choice theory in contemporary political science reflects the dominance of conservative economic forces in American
society).
29. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72
WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1994); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative

Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1681-88 (1975); Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New
Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 422-52 (1987); Werhan, supra note 21. For a general overview of
the history of administrative law, see Rabin, supra note 23.
30. For a recent work that reflects this dichotomous view of attitudes toward the administrative state, see William E. Nelson, The Growth of Distrust: The Emergence of Hostility Toward
Government Regulation of the Economy, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1996); see also Robert
Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty Years of Law and Politics,

54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 257, 276 (1991) (contrasting "optimistic pluralism" and "pessimistic pluralism"); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Florrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest,
and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990) (special issue)
(contrasting "public interest" and "capture theory" views).
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in particular for the extraordinary burst of judicial energy and creativity devoted to reform of administrative law that occurred between
1967 and 1983. The perceived pattern of judicial doctrine takes the
dialectical form of thesis-antithesis-synthesis, not a steady movement
from one pole to another. This suggests the need for a more complex
theory about the movement of judicial ideology with regard to the
administrative state during the period in question.
My suggestion for a revised historical account is that judicial attitudes proceeded in three stages. 3a Thus, I would start, like the standard account, with the understanding that in the first two decades
after the adoption of the APA the dominant assumption was that all
institutions, including administrative agencies, generally act to promote the public interest. Then I would hypothesize an intermediate
stage in evolving judicial attitudes, in which agencies were seen as entities uniquely prone to capture by interest groups and other pathologies. This loss of faith in agencies, however, was not accompanied by
a similar loss of faith in activist government; in particular, other institutions of government-including the courts and the legislaturewere still regarded as capable of advancing the public interest. Finally, this intermediate period gave way to the present state of affairs,
where I again would rejoin the standard account and see the dominant
attitude as one of pessimism about all institutions of the administrative state-agencies, legislatures, and to a considerable degree even
the courts themselves.
The advantage of hypothesizing a step-like spread of pessimism
about governmental institutions is that it can explain the surge of judicial activism that takes place in the middle period of this fifty-year
evolution. If one imagines a period when judges regard agencies as
being uniquely prone to interest group capture and other pathologies,
but the legislature and the courts are regarded as being immune from
these effects, then this describes an ideal set of conditions for judicial
activism designed to "perfect" administrative agencies so that these
pathologies can be overcome. Or, to put it slightly differently, a set of
conditions in which there would be significant support for judicial ef31. Other accounts suggest somewhat analogous stages. See
CHAOS,

&

GOVERNANCE:

JERRY

L. MASHAW, GREED,

USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW

6-25 (1997) (divid-

ing recent history into (1) progressive and New Deal political science; (2) optimistic activism;
and (3) pessimism); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73

CORNELL

L.

REV.

1101, 1104

(1988) (dividing the last fifty years into (1) the New Deal-APA era; (2) the Environmental era;
and (3) the Global-Deregulatory era); Werhan, supra note 21, passim.
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forts to remake agencies so that they conform more closely to the idealized image of the public interest model of the preceding era.
In somewhat greater detail, my thesis envisions the following relationship between judicial attitudes toward the administrative state
and administrative law doctrine in each of the three periods.
A.

The Public Interest Era

During the 1946-1966 period, the dominant understanding of the
administrative agencies was that they were instruments for promoting
the public interest. In this sense, the first two decades under the APA
reflect a continuation of the philosophy that rationalized the expansion of the administrative state under the New Deal. To be sure, there
were other strands of thought at work during these years. There was,
perhaps most prominently, the conservative rule-of-law ideology associated with the American Bar Association, which wanted administrative agencies brought under a greater degree of judicial control in
order to preserve traditional rights of property and autonomy. 32 This
perspective, of course, was a force behind the enactment of the APA
itself, 33 and it was by no means fully spent in the 1950s and 1960s. 34 In
addition, these years witnessed a rebirth of interest in group theory,
albeit in a much more benign and optimistic version than that which
has become familiar in the public choice era.
Notwithstanding these qualifications, however, I would maintain
that the dominant attitude toward the administrative state continued
to be the public interest conception. This was the mindset of the men
(they were almost all men) in their thirties and forties who had served
in the New Deal, and who fanned out to fill administrative, academic,
and judicial posts in the 1950s and early 1960s. They viewed their task
as "domesticating" the APA, so as to preserve the legacy of the New
Deal in the face of threats by the defenders of corporate wealth.
The public interest theory is a species of rationalism-that is, the
faith that complex problems can be mastered by human reason.35 The
32. See Rabin, supra note 23, at 1263-1266.
33. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Legal Profession and the Development of Administrative
Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1119 (1996).
34. See, e.g., Morgan Thomas, The Selection of Federal Hearing Examiners: Pressure
Groups and the Administrative Process, 59 YALE L.J. 431 (1950) (recounting efforts of the organized bar-ultimately unsuccessful-to influence the selection of new hearing examiners under
the APA).
35. This faith did not originate with the New Deal, of course. In the American context, it
played a large role in the progressive movement that flourished in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries. For a representative statement, see WALTER LIPPMAN, DRIFr AND MASTERY (1914).
The classic statement of rationalism during the New Deal era is JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMIN.
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administrative agency was regarded as an institution specifically
designed to achieve this ideal. The agency is a centralized source of
governmental authority that can bring coordinated solutions to social
and economic problems throughout its jurisdiction (which in the case
of a federal agency, is the entire country). It combines all governmental powers, legislative, executive, and judicial, under one convenient
roof. Its leadership is expected to be nonpolitical or at least bipartisan. And its staff is expected to have the specialized information and
systematic knowledge-in other words, the expertise-to comprehend
complex problems and to fashion rational solutions to them.
The public interest theory also includes, at least implicitly, a theory of comparative institutional advantage. The other institutions to
which one might turn for bringing complex problems under the control of human reason are all wanting in some critical respect. Markets
collectively embody a great deal of specialized information, but they
are decentralized and uncontrolled. Courts can obtain specialized information about isolated controversies, but they too are decentralized
and lack expertise. The legislature is a potential source of centralized
authority, but it typically lacks specialized information and expertise.
Thus, administrative agencies are more likely to achieve the objective
of bringing complex phenomena under the control of human reason
than are any of these rival institutions.
The public interest theory acknowledges that sometimes the administrative process will misfire. This is the public interest rationale
for judicial review of administrative action as provided for by the
APA-to backstop administrative performance and to correct the occasional errant decision by expert agencies. On the whole, however,
this perspective suggests that courts should proceed with great caution
in reviewing agency action, because as a rule agencies are better at
achieving the public interest (as defined) than are courts. Thus, courts
should not substitute their judgment for that of the agency, and should
take care not to interfere with agency processes by hamstringing agencies with needless procedural impediments.
If the public interest theory was indeed the dominant attitude toward the administrative state, then we would expect to find an administrative common law during the 1946-1966 period that would
maximize the sphere of authority of agencies in setting policy relative
(1938). See also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN
COALJDIRTY AIR 4-7 (1981) (characterizing the "New Deal ideal"); THOMAS K. MCCRAW,
PROPHETS OF REGULATION 153-221 (1984) (recounting Landis' role in formulating New Deal
ISTRATIVE PROCESS

theory of administration); Sunstein, supra note 29.
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to courts. Thus, in interpreting provisions governing the availability
and scope of judicial review, courts would tilt toward a restrictive view
of availability of review and a narrow scope of review. With respect to
the larger constitutional framework, we would expect interpretations
that would downplay separation of powers objections to the creation
of administrative agencies as a "fourth branch" of government, and
general caution about any ruling that might interfere with the design
and operation of agencies.
B.

The Capture Theory Era

During the period from roughly 1967 to 1983, the public interest
theory gave way to a different paradigm of the administrative state.
The rationalist ideal of the preceding period was displaced by what
might be called a populist ideal. The public interest conception
pointed toward government by supposedly nonpolitical agency experts, who could gather the information and develop solutions to complex problems that could be imposed on a centralized basis. The new
populist mood that emerged around 1967 did not question the need
for governmental solutions to social and economic problems. But it
was deeply disturbed by the notion that those solutions should emerge
from insulated agency experts.
The primary pathology of agency government emphasized during
the era was that agencies were likely to become "captured" by the
business organizations that they are charged with regulating. Other
pathologies were cited as well. For example, agencies were commonly
regarded as mindless "bureaucracies" more concerned with expanding
their budgets and making life comfortable for tenured civil servants
36
than with attending to the needs of the beneficiaries of regulation.
Whatever malady was chosen for emphasis, "[t]he image of the 'rogue
agency' animated discussions of regulation's discontents. ' 37 Formerly
regarded as the best hope for bringing complex social phenomena
under the control of human reason, the agency was now viewed as a
uniquely vulnerable governmental institution highly susceptible to
failure.
It is important not to overstate the degree of ideological discontinuity from the first period to the second. The basic ideal of the first
period-correcting the failures of the marketplace and the inequities
36. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERN-

MENT 81 (1971) (hypothesizing that agencies act always so as to try to maximize the size of their
budget).
37. Rodriguez, supra note 29, at 24.
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of private power through government regulation-was not abandoned. Indeed, if anything, suspicion of private ordering and faith in
government grew during the second era relative to the first. However,
the New Deal's chosen instrument for realizing governmental control-the administrative agency-was now seen as being seriously
flawed. What was needed, consequently, was reform and renewal of
the administrative state, not a reconceptualization of the role of government altogether. Those institutions which had not fallen under a
cloud of disrepute-the legislature and the courts-were therefore required to step forward to modify the incentives and processes of agencies so that they could be reconstituted in a way more likely to lead to
success in achieving the basic goal of public interest regulation.
This new conception of the administrative state was embraced
with the greatest fervor by radical reformers whose attitudes were
forged in the civil rights and antiwar struggles of the 1960s. But it also
affected the attitudes of many men in their fifties and sixties who
started life as committed New Dealers, but had spent a consideration
portion of their careers observing administrative agencies at firsthand
and had become disenchanted. James Landis fit this description almost perfectly. 38 Of greater importance, however, were the aging
lions of the D.C. Circuit-men like Judges Bazelon, Leventhal, McGowan, and Wright-who had started their legal careers in the New
Deal and now watched in dismay as administrative agencies increasingly came under fire.
Notice that capture theory, as I describe it, also contains a theory
of comparative institutional advantage. Implicit in capture theory is
the understanding that the central problem of the administrative state
is a relatively limited one. Only administrative agencies are subject to
the unique pathologies of bureaucracy such as interest group capture.
Rival institutions, like the legislature and the courts, were implicitly
regarded as being immune from these pathologies or at least as suffering from them to a significantly diminished degree. Moreover, in
terms of interest group influence, the problematic actor was seen to be
the business lobby. Other groups, such as labor unions or advocates
38. After authoring the definitive defense of New Deal style administrative agencies in
1938, see LANDIS, supra note 35, Dean Landis prepared a report for President-elect Kennedy in
1960 that was highly critical of the performance of administrative agencies and urged that they
be brought under closer Presidential control. See JAMES M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY
AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT, printed for use of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). See generally MCCRAW, supra note 35, at 153-221 (recounting Landis's career and influence).
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for civil rights or the environment, were tacitly assumed to be champions of the public interest.
Capture theory's limited view of institutional pathology and inappropriate group influence created an ideal atmosphere for vigorous
reform efforts. For example, one solution might be for Congress to
enact more detailed legislation, thereby helping to ensure that policy
is made by a healthy democratic institution (the legislature), and leaving comparatively little room for the corrupted institution (the
agency) to undermine that policy. And in fact, there was a decisive
move in the early 1970s toward enacting longer and more detailed
39
regulatory statutes, in order to constrain the discretion of agencies.
These statutes typically provided for policy to be made by informal
rulemaking open to all, and included strict deadlines for the adoption
40
of rules that could be enforced by citizen suits in court.
More importantly for present purposes, capture theory also suggests that aggressive judicial oversight and control of agencies is
needed in order to counteract the distortions of the administrative
process introduced by interest group capture and other pathologies.
Specifically, by forcing agencies to adopt an administrative process
that is more open and to give greater consideration to underrepresented viewpoints in that process, courts may be able to counteract the distortions emphasized by the theory.
If capture theory was indeed the dominant attitude toward the
administrative state in the period from roughly 1967 to 1983, then we
would expect to see a very different administrative common law during this period. Generally speaking, the balance of power should shift
perceptibly from agencies to courts. Thus, courts should tilt toward an
expansive view of the availability of review and perhaps also a more
intrusive scope of review. With respect to the larger constitutional
framework, we might see some movement toward limiting congressional power to delegate policymaking authority to administrative
agencies; it is doubtful, however, that courts would call into question
the very constitutionality of agencies, because the underlying objective of the New Deal-bringing complex social phenomena under the
control of activist government-still remained very much alive.
39. See ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 35 at 7-12 (describing "ends-forcing" strategy
of the Clean Air Act); MARTIN SHAPIRO. WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? 78-87 (1988) [hereinafter SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?]; Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman,

Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J.
819, 821-845 (detailing trend to greater statutory specificity in the 1970s and 1980s).
40. See MASHAW, supra note 31, at 22-23.
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C.

The Public Choice Era

Finally, in the period from roughly 1983 to the present, a new
conception of the administrative state, which I will call the public
choice conception, has been ascendent. In adopting this label, I am
not suggesting that the academic school of thought called public
choice theory4 ' has been studied and absorbed by most judges or
other public figures. I am, instead, using this label as a shorthand for a
general skepticism about activist government in all its forms. Today,
the "public interest" is seen as something more likely to emerge from
the decentralized decisions of individually rational actors pursuing
their own interest, i.e., through market ordering, than as coming about
either through government regulation guided by human reason or
government regulation guided by a more genuinely representative administrative process.
Public choice theory itself emphasizes two reasons for harboring
this pessimism about the administrative state. One concern is with the
coherence of decisionmaking by political institutions, and in particular
with the possibility of "cycling" among different preferences with the
42
result that no stable outcome is realized by political institutions.
Another concern is that compact groups whose members have high
per capita stakes in a controversy will out-organize and out-influence
larger and more diffuse groups, resulting in a pervasive "minoritarian
43
bias" on the part of decisionmakers.
But the precise reason for pessimism about government is less
significant, for purposes of my theory, than the fact of its existence.
For whatever reason, the recent era has been characterized by widespread pessimism about the capacity of any governmental institution
to achieve results that will promote the public interest. In effect, capture theory's pessimism about the performance of administrative
44
agencies has been generalized to include all political institutions.
41. For overviews of the literature, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND
PUBLIC CHOICE (1991); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the
Understandingof Public Law, 65 CHL.-KENT L. REV. 123 (1989).
42. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 41 at 38-62.
43. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1965).
44. The critical importance of the spread of pessimism to include the legislature is rightly
stressed in Glicksman & Schroeder, supra note 30, at 276-81. Once the legislature, no less than
the agency, is seen as a forum of interest group intrigue, courts lose enthusiasm for enforcing the
"purposes" of statutes against agency decisions, and begin viewing statutes as reflecting "ordinary" values rather than something entitled to judicial solicitude. Id. at 281-286.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1039

This is the mindset of the Young Turks who grew up during the postWar boom years, and entered into responsible administrative, journalistic, and judicial positions during the "Reagan Revolution" of the
1980s.
Public choice theory has its own theory of comparative institutional advantage, but it is one that is startlingly different from the per45
spective to the two prior conceptions of the administrative state.
Public choice theory suggests that the public interest will best be
served by transferring decisional authority away from political institutions altogether, including not just administrative agencies but also
from legislatures and possibly courts as well. The prime candidate for
receiving such authority is, of course, "the market," understood to
mean a social arrangement whereby outcomes are reached through
the decentralized action of individual actors presumed to be rationally
pursuing their own interests. This explains, among other things, the
rise of the deregulation movement, which began in the Carter Administration, accelerated during the Reagan years, and shows no signs of
abating.
Given the "pox on all houses" attitude of the public choice conception of the administrative state, its implications for administrative
common law are highly uncertain. Perhaps the most apparent prediction would be that where issues arise that implicate the market or
market-mimicking mechanisms as an alternative to traditional regulation, we would expect courts to endorse a movement away from traditional regulation. More importantly, because all government
institutions are suspect, we would expect to see little judicial enthusiasm for shifting authority from one institution to another. To the contrary, we might find courts attracted to formalistic rules that may
minimize uncertainty about the availability and scope of judicial review, because this would avoid deadweight losses associated with disputing issues that have no clearly preferred answers. Otherwise we
would very likely see a general lack of enthusiasm for judicial innovation, and a drift in doctrine with no clear preference for either agencies or courts. With respect to the larger constitutional framework, we
might see a revival of separation of powers theory that would discourage public regulation altogether, or interpretations that would encourage private property and market ordering. But we would not
expect to see a revival of ideas like the nondelegation doctrine that
45. See generally KOMESAR, supra note 43, at 3-13 (drawing upon public choice theory to
develop a "participation-centered approach" to comparative institutional analysis).
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would discourage the use of administrative agencies as an alternative
to congressional government, because there is no clear preference for
legislatures relative to agencies.

II.

CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

What evidence can be adduced in support of my hypothesis that
public and judicial attitudes toward the administrative state have gone
through three stages from 1946 to the present, roughly translated as
global optimism, disenchantment with agencies, and global pessimism-or (simplifying even more radically), as rationalism, populism,
and libertarianism? Obviously, it would be a Herculean task-well
beyond the limited space I have here not to mention my limited capacities-to offer anything like a definitive account of what political
scientists, economists, law professors, and journalists were saying
about the administrative state during each of the three eras in question, and how these ideas may have filtered into the minds of the
judges. Moreover, as noted above, any catalogue of the views of individual thinkers is open to the charge of selection bias. There is also
the problem that just because academics are entranced with an idea, it
does not follow that it registers with the members of the judiciary. For
example, Kenneth Arrow wrote Social Choice and Individual Values
in 1951, but it does not follow that judges in the 1950s (or later) ever
heard of the book, let alone that they had absorbed the thesis that
institutions faced with deciding multiple issues and governed by majority voting rules are prone to decisional incoherence.
I know of no easy way around these problems. By way of partial
reassurance, I would note that what follows is fairly conventional, in
the sense that different aspects of the three conceptions of the administrative state I bring together have been noted by many others
before. 46 The only novelty lies in the tripartite synthesis, the suppression of complicating detail and subthemes (at least I contend they are
details and subthemes), and the treatment of the most recent period in
a descriptive rather than normative spirit (which for the lawyers, at
46. In addition to the articles by Aman, Rabin, Rodriguez, Stewart, Sunstein, and Werhan
cited supra nn.21, 23, 29 & 31, useful historical reviews that cover the themes here include
CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990); Daniel J. Gifford, The New Deal Regulatory Model: A History of Criticisms and
Refinements, 68 MINN. L. REV. 299 (1983); McCRAw, supra note 35, at 210-221; Richard J.
Pierce, Jr. The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L.
REV. 469 (1985); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Reform of the American Administrative Process:
The Contemporary Debate, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 385; Cass R. Sunstein, Changing Conceptions of
Administration, 1987 BYU L. REV. 927.
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least, almost always means hostile or critical spirit-administrative
law scholars are generally very unhappy with the recent turn of
events).
A. 1946-1966
During the APA's first two decades, the understanding of the administrative state was overwhelmingly influenced by the after-glow of
the New Deal. Generalizing broadly, the political science of the era
was optimistic about the nature of the administrative state and the
capacity of administrative agencies to serve the public interest. In
particular, concern about interest groups, which has recurred at regular intervals in American history, 47 seems to have been largely muted
during this period. Academic commentators were generally confident
that the political institutions of democracy could either neutralize or
harness the parochialism of groups and thereby develop policies in the
public interest.
The foregoing generalization lumps together two otherwise disparate strands of thought. It includes, on the one hand, neo-progressives
who thought that the answer to interest group influence was to insulate expert administrative agencies from ordinary politics. The most
obvious example is James Landis, whose 1938 lectures entitled The
Administrative Process48 became the classic defense of the New Deal
agencies and was widely cited during this period. The generalization
also covers a newer post-War generation of pluralist thinkers, such as
David Truman, Earl Latham, and Robert Dahl. 49 The unifying theme
among these political scientists was that competition among groups
within the political arena would produce a kind of equilibrium roughly
coincident with the public interest.
With respect to legal literature, the overall picture was also overwhelmingly supportive of positive regulation and the New Deal-style
administrative agencies. The administrative law scholarship of the era
was dominated by an energetic corps of academics-including Clark
Byse, Kenneth Culp Davis, Louis Jaffe, Walter Gellhorn, Nathaniel
Nathanson, and Bernard Schwartz-most of whom had served in the
New Deal in one capacity or another. Their work was generally in the
mode of Legal Process school, with an emphasis on elucidating "principled" rules that would define the respective roles of courts and agen47. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
48. LANDIS, supra note 35.

49. See ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO
(1952); DAVID B. TRUMAN,

POLITICS

GOVERNS? (1961); EARL LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF
THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951).
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cies. 50 The overall objective was to legitimize the discretionary
powers of agencies by assimilating them into a legal process that emphasized the importance of clearly articulated agency standards and
the availability of judicial review as a check on abuses of agency
51
discretion.
The legal scholarship of the era is epitomized by Judge Henry
Friendly's Holmes Lectures on federal administrative agencies delivered at Harvard in 1962.52 Friendly acknowledged that administrative
agencies are often criticized. But he argued that almost all the shortcomings of agencies would disappear if they could only be induced to
53
articulate more definite legal standards to guide their decisions. Significantly, he rejected out of hand the possibility that these standards
should come from reviewing courts. 54 The primary source would have
to be the agencies themselves. This, in turn, would require
the appointment of commissioners of higher intellectual power and
moral courage, establishing a longer term and pursuing a tradition
of reappointment, affording the commissioners more opportunity
for study and reflection by freeing them from the multitude of routheir time, and enforctine tasks that now encroach so heavily upon
55
ing individual responsibility for opinions.
He added that encouraging agencies to make greater use of policy
56
statements and rulemaking would also help.
Friendly was aware of the incipient literature on agency cap58
ture, 57 and also understood the interest group theory of legislation.
But like Landis before him, he was wedded to a faith "in discretionary
government carried on by an assumed enlightened and apolitical
50. For valuable discussion of the tenets of the Legal Process school, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historicaland Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW li (1994); Jan Vetter, Postwar Legal Scholarship on Judicial
Decisionmaking, 33 J.LEGAL EDUC. 412 (1983); G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned
Elaboration: JurisprudentialCriticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973).

51. Other commentators have also noted the connection between the Legal Process school
and the administrative law of the 1950s and 1960s. See Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1334-55 (1984); Werhan, supra note 21, at 57683.
52. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS (1962).

53. Id. at 5-6.

54. Id. at 141.
55. Id. at 142-43 (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 145.
57. Id. at 2 n.6, 4 n.13 (citing MARVER H.
DEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955)).
58. Id. at 167-68.

BERNSTEIN, REGULATING

BUSINESS BY IN-
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elite." '59 Simply put, Friendly took the existence of the administrative
state in its post-New Deal configuration as a given. It could use some
rejuvenation, mostly in the form of the appointment of "better men"
who would adopt more far-sighted policies. But in its basic conception he regarded the administrative state as sound and beyond
questioning.
Perhaps more revealing than an establishment thinker like
Friendly, even the mavericks of the time betrayed the influence of the
public interest conception of the administrative state. One of the
most provocative articles of the period appeared in the Yale Law Journal in 1952 under the title The Marasmus of the ICC.60 Samuel Huntington, then an untenured instructor in government at Harvard,
argued that the Interstate Commerce Commission had become increasingly dependent on the railroads for political support. Consequently, it had lost its claim to impartiality, whether in mediating
between the interests of railroads and shippers, or railroads and competing modes of surface transportation. This in turn had alienated
these other potential sources of political support, with the result that
the ICC "may be said to suffer from administrative marasmus," that
61
is, a gradual and continuous wasting away of the body from disease.
Huntington's analysis was directly inspired by the new pluralist
theories of the early 1950s.6 2 By suggesting that the ICC was responsive to group demands, and that its political support in Congress was a
function of the balance of rival group demands, Huntington was advancing a conception of the administrative state considerably at odds
with the dominant legal process vision. Not surprisingly, therefore,
the Marasmus article stimulated a heated rejoinder from an ICC
staffer 63 and a milder rebuke from a former general counsel of the
Commerce Department, 64 which in turn led to a further roundtable
65
discussion.
59. A.

THE LAW AT HARVARD 305 (1967), quoted in GELLHORN ET AL.,
7 (8th ed. 1987).
60. Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and
the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952).
61. Id. at 470.
62. See id. at 470 n.10 (citing TRUMAN, supra note 49).
63. Charles S. Morgan, A Critique of "The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the
Railroads, and the Public Interest," 62 YALE L.J. 171 (1953).
64. C. Dickerman Williams, Transportation Regulation and the Department of Commerce,
62 YALE L.J. 563 (1953).
65. See Samuel P. Huntington, C. Dickerman Williams, & Charles S. Morgan, The ICC
Reexamined: A Colloquy, 63 YALE L.J. 44 (1953).
SUTHERLAND,

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
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Of greater interest than the defense of the idea of agency expertise elicited from mainstream lawyers, however, is the recommendation that Huntington himself developed from his group analysis.
Huntington proposed that the ICC be abolished and replaced with a
client-oriented agency that, along with similar entities representing
other surface transportation modes, would be folded together into the
Commerce Department. The result would be to place authority over
transportation policy in an body that would possess "a broader outlook and a broader basis of political support," and which therefore
would be "better able to act in the public interest. ' 66 In other words,
Huntington himself did not deny the public interest ideal; he simply
redefined it in terms of an appropriate balance of group forces mediated through pluralist compromise, as opposed to something to be discovered through the application of neutral expertise.
If the public interest conception had a solid hold on academic
thought during these years, there can also be little doubt that it was
also thoroughly assimilated by the judiciary. The Supreme Court was
itself heavily populated with former New Deal lawyers, including Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, Reed, Murphy, Douglas, Goldberg, and
Fortas. And it would be easy to collect passages from leading administrative law cases of the era that speak with conviction about the need
to resolve policy questions in accordance with "administrative expertise."' 67 Judge Friendly's attitudes, although more nuanced than the
views reflected in these statements, are probably fairly representative
of those of the more influential judges of the era. The public interest
theory was simply an unshakable postulate, part of the mental furniture that judges brought with them in deciding contested issues of administrative law.
B.

1967-1983

If the unifying assumption of the first period was a desire to integrate administrative agencies into a larger vision of legal regularity
66. Huntington, supra note 60, at 508-09.
67. In SEC v. Chenery, for example, the Court concluded with the following observations:
The Commission's conclusion here rests squarely in that area where administrative
judgments are entitled to the greatest amount of weight by appellate courts. It is the
product of administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the problem,
realization of the statutory policies, and responsible treatment of the uncontested facts.
It is the type of judgment which administrative agencies are best equipped to make and
which justifies the use of the administrative process.
332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947) (Chenery II). For similar statements, see United States v. Western Pac.
R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 65-67 (1956); Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75
(1952).
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and legitimacy, the unifying theme of the second was disenchantment
with agency performance and urgent demands for reform. The 1960s
and 1970s were of course a time of great turmoil, what with the War in
Vietnam, the civil rights movement, riots in the cities and on campuses, and the Watergate scandal. Thus, it is probably no accident
that David Halberstam's best selling account of the origins of the War
in Vietnam68-which heaped scorn on the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations for their exaggerated faith in the judgments of defense
and foreign policy experts-appeared at about the same time that
courts seemed to lose their faith in agency experts. Few were ready to
turn their backs on activist government: the New Frontier and Great
Society suggested to most observers that activist government could do
many good things. But the idea that effective government means
management by a politically neutral technocratic elite fell into deep
disfavor.
In the academic literature, the loss of faith in agency expertise
was commonly expressed in terms of capture theory. 6 9 The idea of

agency capture can be traced to a book published by Marver Bernstein in 1955.70 Building in part on Huntington's work on the ICC,
Bernstein posited that agencies go through a natural "life cycle." The
early stages of the cycle are characterized by vigorous and independent regulation, not unlike the role for agencies imagined by the public
interest literature. But in the later stages of the cycle, which Bernstein
called agency "senescence," the agency often becomes closely identified with and dependent upon the industry it is charged with regulating. Thus, agency capture was seen by Bernstein as a natural but
exceptional phenomenon that occurred primarily in the waning days
of an agency's existence.
By the time the late 1960s rolled around, agency capture had
come to be regarded as something more akin to the universal condition of the administrative state.71 One influential work of political science that helped to popularize the new perspective was Theodore
Lowi's The End of Liberalism.72 Lowi's ideas defy easy summary, but
68. DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST (1969).
69. Not exclusively, of course; some academic treatments reflected a loss of faith in expertise for other reasons. See, e.g., Julius G. Getman & Stephen B. Goldberg, The Myth of Labor
Board Expertise, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1972) (criticizing the National Labor Relations Board
for not using social science methods to investigate workplace realities).
70. BERNSTEIN, supra note 57, at 79-94.
71. The account of the rise of capture theory here parallels that in John Shepard Wiley Jr.,
A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723-725 (1986).
72. THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969).
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there was no mistaking his tone. Without questioning the expanded
sphere of government produced by the New Deal, he was nonetheless
scathingly critical of the "interest group liberalism" that was its modern legacy. He characterized the existing administrative state as incoherent and unjust, and called for radical reform to restore genuine
democracy serving the interests of the people. One startling proposal
was that courts should revive the nondelegation doctrine, in order to
73
force Congress to remain accountable for key policy decisions.
Another, and very different, critique of the administrative state,
this time associated with the Chicago School of Economics, also began
to gain currency about this time. Chicagoans like Milton Friedman
and George Stigler argued that much government regulation is
designed to restrict entry and thus confer monopoly profits on industry incumbents. 74 Although the Chicago critique was broad enough to
include legislative as well as administrative capture, in practice during
this period it tended to concentrate on examples drawn from the
world of administrative agencies, such as public utility commissions
and professional licensing boards. 75 Before long, "other economic
scholars began to treat as naive and faintly amusing any approach to
'76
regulation that did not incorporate notions of producer capture.
By a curious symmetry, New Left economists and historians soon
began espousing a similar critique of administrative agencies. Gabriel
Kolko, perhaps the most prominent member of this group, published
an important study of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 77 in
which he argued that the agency had been formed for the very purposes of cartelizing railroad rates, thereby allowing wealthy capitalist
robber barons to bilk small farmers and businesses.
These various strands of academic capture theory roiled together
into a general pot of discontent, out of which emerged a new popular
muckraking literature. The principal purveyors of this populist strain
73. See id. at 297-98.
74. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 125-128, 137-160 (1962);
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.Sci. 3 (1971),
reprinted in GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION 114-

134 (1975).
75. See the various studies collected in CHICAGO STUDIES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (George
J. Stigler ed., 1988). Another contemporaneous strand of economic literature that contributed to
the general disenchantment with administrative agencies posited that agencies seek continually
to expand their budgets. See NISKANEN, supra note 36.
76. Wiley, supra note 71, at 725.
77. GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1877-1916 (1965); see also GABRIEL
KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY,
1900-1916 (1963) (arguing that the policies of the progressive era were generally designed to
serve the interests of big business).
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of capture theory were the so-called "Nader Raiders," who produced
a string of monographs and associated publicity in the late 1960s and
early 1970s castigating various agencies for cozying up to big business
and ignoring the public interest. 78 It is safe to assume that this Naderite version of capture theory was familiar to journalists and editorial
writers, and thus began to enter the public consciousness around this
time.
The legal literature of the late 1960s and early 1970s inevitably
displays greater caution and continuity with the past. One reason is
that administrative law scholarship continued to be dominated by the
same cadre of New Deal veterans who had been the leading legal
figures in the prior period. A particularly instructive example is Louis
Jaffe, who at the threshold of the period published an influential book
drawing on his considerable experience and erudition. 79 The book
opens by sounding a number a themes of the social science literature.
Jaffe notes that the defenders of the New Deal are "disillusioned,"
and that agency bias toward the industry it is charged with regulating
has come to be regarded as a pervasive problem.8 0 Some of Jaffe's
specific ideas about administrative law doctrine-such as his "rash"
proposition that there should be a "presumption of a right to judicial
review" 8 1-also were clearly influential with courts in the second era.
But overall, Jaffe's analysis was far too nuanced, far too concerned
with achieving an integration with historical materials, to be regarded
as triggering a revolution. In terms of temperment, his work, like
Friendly's, must be regarded as more the swan song of the old era,
rather than the tocsin heralding in the new.
As the 1960s came to a close, however, and the Naderites were at
the peak of their influence, the legal literature begun to take on an
edge that was missing in the prior era. In 1969, for example, Professor
Kenneth Culp Davis published a monograph on the same general
theme as Judge Friendly's Holmes lectures-the need to structure
agency discretion through the adoption of legal standards. 82 Yet while
Friendly had adopted the reassuring tone of one member of an elite
institution reflecting on the wellbeing of another elite institution, Davis' book reads like a stump speech delivered at a campus rally.
78. See, e.g., EDWARD F. Cox, ET AL., THE NADER REPORT ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969); JOHN C. EsPosrro, VANISHING AIR (1970); JAMES S. TURNER, THE CHEMICAL

(1970); DAVID ZWICK & MARCY BENSTOCK, WATER WASTELAND (1971).
79. Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965).
80. Id. at 3-27.
81. Id. at 336.
82. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
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Agency discretion unguided by legal standards is "tyranny. '8 3 Abuses
and illegalities abound. Police and prosecutors are extreme examples
of administrative agencies operating without any meaningful legal
constraints on their discretion. In substance, there was little here that
was not canvassed by Friendly and others in the prior period. The
mood of the Davis book, however, was agitated and activist-and entirely different than that of Judge Friendly's.
Another influential work by a mainstream legal scholar was Professor James Freedman's Crisis and Legitimacy.84 Freedman argued
that the administrative state throughout American history has alternated between periods of crisis and periods of relative quiescence and,
of course, that the current era was a period of crisis. He cited a
number of reasons for this, including the widespread perception of
agency capture 85 as well as renewed concerns about agency legitimacy.
What is especially telling about Freedman work, again, is the sense of
urgency about the need for vigorous reform of the administrative state
in order to restore a sense of its legitimacy.
For present purposes, however, undoubtedly the most illuminating piece of legal scholarship in the period was Professor Richard
Stewart's magisterial article, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, which attempted to understand and evaluate the new administrative law then taking shape. 86 Stewart's analysis of these
developments is more original and sophisticated than anything produced by the older generation of administrative law scholars. And
there can be no gainsaying the influence of the article: it is the most
87
widely cited administrative law article ever written.
Stewart characterized the administrative law of the first twenty
years under the APA as the "traditional model," in which the key task
of administrative law was seen as reconciling the discretionary power
of administrative agencies with norms of legislative supremacy. In
contrast, the new administrative law was based on an "interest representation" model, in which administrative law is seen to be bringing
previously excluded or underrepresented interests into the administrative process, thereby producing a more broadly acceptable and pub83. Id. at 3.
84. JAMES 0.

FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY:
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1978).

THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND

85. Id. at 8, 35.
86. Stewart, supra note 29.
87. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 751, 767 (1996) (ranking Stewart's article the eighth-most cited law review article of all
time).
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licly interested result. 88 In both cases the central objective was to
reconcile the administrative state with the ideals of democracy. The
difference was that the traditional model sought to accomplish this
from the outside, by positing a "transmission belt" in which the people
vote for legislators, who vote for laws, which then structure agency
discretion. 89 The new administrative law, in contrast, sought to
achieve the reconciliation from the inside, by transforming agencies
into institutions that would themselves be democratically responsive
and accountable to popular desires.
Two aspects of Stewart's analysis are especially supportive of the
thesis being advocated here. First, he expressly associated the rise of
the new administrative law with a decline of faith in agency expertise
and a growing perception of agency capture. As he observed:
It has become widely accepted, not only by public interest lawyers,
but by academic critics, legislators, judges, and even by some agency
members, that the comparative overrepresentation of regulated or
client interests in the process of agency decision results in a persistent policy bias in favor of these interests. 90
It was largely this perceived distortion in favor of "regulated or client"
interests, according to Stewart, that had triggered the demand for a
new conception of administrative law that would produce a more balanced or accurate representation of interests.
Second, Stewart clearly perceived that the prominent administrative law developments of the late 1960s and early 1970s-such as the
expansion of standing, the presumption in favor of judicial review, and
the extension of due process hearing rights to new classes of interests-were consistent with, and causally related to, this new interest
representation model of administrative law. 91 Courts were expanding
the availability of judicial review, and were imposing new rights of
intervention and hearing requirements, precisely in order to make
agency processes more representative, and thereby to counteract the
effects of agency capture.
In short, Stewart's analysis, written in the middle of what I have
called the second era of administrative common law, directly supports
the thesis that the upsurge in judicial activism from 1967 to 1983 was
related to the populist mistrust of agencies that emerged during those
88. Stewart, supra note 29, at 1711-13.
89. Id. at 1675-76.
90. Id. at 1713 (citations omitted); see also id. at 1683 (recounting increasing doubt about
the existence of an objective "public interest" separate from "the essentially legislative process
of adjusting the competing claims of various private interests").
91. See, e.g., id. at 1728 (standing doctrine); id. at 1761 (rights of participation).
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years. 92 Stewart's analysis is also instructive because of what it does
not assert. Although Stewart discusses the limitations of legislatures
and courts as instruments of policymaking, he does so almost entirely
in terms of agenda-setting limitations: legislatures have limited space
available on their agenda, and courts have limited control over their
agenda. 93 In contrast, there is relatively little discussion in the article
of the possibility that the pathology of interest group capture might
also affect legislatures and courts. The problem of capture was thus
implicitly viewed as one limited largely to administrative agencies, not
a phenomenon afflicting government more generally.
If capture and agency pathologies were widespread themes in academic literature by the late 1960s and early 1970s, is there any evidence that these concerns were shared by courts? In at least one case,
there is considerable evidence. Judge J. Skelly Wright, one of the
leading activists on the D.C. Circuit, alluded to the problem of agency
capture in many judicial opinions and extra-judicial writings. 94 One
especially telling example is his opinion for the court in Home Box
Office, Inc. v. FCC,95 a landmark decision imposing new restrictions
on ex parte communications made to agencies during informal
rulemaking. Wright explained his objection to ex parte communications this way:
Although it is impossible to draw any firm conclusions about the
effect of ex parte presentations upon the ultimate shape of the pay
cable rules, the evidence is certainly consistent with the oftenvoiced claims of undue industry influence over Commission proceedings, and we are particularly concerned that the final shaping of
the rules we are reviewing here may have been by compromise
among contending industry forces, rather than by exercise of the
independent discretion in the public interest the Communications
Act vests in individual commissioners. 96
92. Other commentators have perceived this connection as well. See MASHAW, supra note
31, at 21-23; R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN
AIR Acr 12-13 (1983); SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?, supra note 39, at 72. For a
recent normative analysis that derives the main tenets of 1967-1983 administrative law from an
analysis of capture theory, see Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justificationfor the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1570 (1992).
93. See Stewart, supra note 29, at 1788-89,.1806 (legislature); id. at 1804, 1808 (courts).
94. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wright, J.); Moss v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 430
F.2d 891, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Wright, J.); J. Skelly Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking
Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 397 (1974) [hereinafter
Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process].
95. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829, reh. denied, 434 U.S. 988 (1977).
96. Id. at 53.
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This passage encapsulates all the key features of the capture theory
era: a concern with undue industry influence over agency decision-

making; the adoption of new common law procedural rules in an effort to open up or "ventilate" agency processes so as to neutralize this
influence; and the underlying commitment to salvaging the New Deal
97
ideals of activist government.

One judge, of course, does not a movement make. But Judge
Wright was an exceptionally influential judge. He was the author of

many of the most important administrative law decisions of the era,
many of which bear the imprint of capture theory ideas. 98 And his
prestige was so great that all he had to do each year was pick up the
telephone, and invite the newly elected editor-in-chief of the Harvard,
Yale or Chicago law reviews to serve as his law clerk after graduation. 99 A very high percentage of these clerks went on to clerk on the
Supreme Court, presumably there to disseminate the gospel of capture theory when the occasional administrative law decision came
before the high Court.

Other judges on the D.C. Circuit also betrayed in their writings
an awareness of capture theory, although they were more circumspect
than Judge Wright. 100 There is also, significantly, evidence in the rhetoric of some of the Supreme Court's decisions of the era that the idea
of agency capture, or at least severe disenchantment with agencies,

had an influence on the Court's decisions. 1

1

Before we leave the middle period, one general observation

about the pathway of intellectual influence is in order. There is very
97. Judge Wright's attachment to capture theory also explains his advocacy of a revived
nondelegation doctrine. See J. Skelly Wright, Beyond DiscretionaryJustice, 81 YALE L.J. 575,
579 (1972) (reviewing KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1971)) [hereinafter

Wright, Beyond DiscretionaryJustice]. Recall that Theodore Lowi made a similar proposal as a
way of transferring decisional authority from "captured" agencies to the legislature, presumed to
be less susceptible to interest group intrigue. See Lowi, supra note 72, at 297-98.
98. In addition to the decisions cited supra in notes 94 and 95, see MCI Telecomms. Corp. v.
FCC, 561 F.2d 365, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973).
99. See Bill Monroe, In Memoriam: J. Skelly Wright, 102 HARV. L. REV. 369, 373 (1988).
100. See David L. Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL
L. REV. 817, 829 (1977) (endorsing Professor Stewart's "interest representation" theory as a
proper characterization of the objectives of administrative law); Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 555 (1974) (endorsing
hard look review based in part on the need to force "mission oriented agencies" to take due
cognizance of environmental values); see also Glicksman & Schroeder, supra note 30, at 264-268
(collecting a variety of environmental law opinions from the late 1960s and early 1970s that
reflect the influence of capture theory).
101. John Wiley collects numerous statements from antitrust immunity decisions in support
of his thesis, parallel to mine, that capture theory influenced the Court during these years. See
Wiley, supra note 71, at 727-728.
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little evidence that the revolution in administrative law that started
around 1967 was caused by changes in legal scholarship. This does not
mean that changes in ideology were not critical. But the "transmission belt" of influence, to borrow Professor Stewart's metaphor,
seems to have been from social science scholarship to popular literature to courts. The first judicial decisions that reflect the new administrative law date from 1965 or 1966.102 However, the earliest law
review article I have been able to identify arguing in favor of expanded access and heightened review on the basis of capture theory
bears the date 1971.103 And that article was not written by a legal
academic but by two public interest lawyers. Thus, it appears that
legal scholars got into the act only after the courts started changing
administrative law.
This, of course, is what one would expect, as long as legal scholarship takes as its primary data the decisions of courts. Legal scholars
who take their cues from courts will always end up playing "catch-up,"
attempting to integrate judicial innovations with previously established understandings and (perhaps) with social science literature.
10 4
But they will rarely serve as catalysts for change.
C.

1983-Present

There is little question that the period from roughly 1967 to 1983
was characterized by widespread disillusionment with agencies, focusing in particular on the problem of capture. From the vantage point of
a legal academic, however, it is difficult to perceive any sharp discontinuity between the intellectual preoccupations of the middle era and
those of today; nor is it easy to identify a dominant "paradigm" that
has emerged to replace the concerns of that era. Part of the problem,
no doubt, is that law schools have become a veritable cornucopia-or
perhaps cacophony is a better word-of "theory." Thus, starting in
the 1970s and accelerating into the 1980s and 1990s, the law school
world has seen political science and economics perspectives supplemented by critical legal studies, the civic republican revival, feminist
theory, critical race theory, postmodernist theory, libertarian political
102. See Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1003-04 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Comm. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965), cert denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
103. Simon Lazarus & Joseph Onek, The Regulators and the People, 57 VA. L. REV. 1069
(1971).
104. For-more general reflections consistent with this observation, see Ronald A. Cass &
Jack M. Beermann, Throwing Stones at the Mudbank: The Impact of Scholarship on Administrative Law, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1993).
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theory, and so forth. 10 5 Not surprisingly, normative administrative law
scholarship has drawn on these alternative intellectual perspectives to
develop various rivalrous conceptions of the proper role of administrative common law, which academics have then urged on the
106

courts.

One lesson of our review of the intellectual climate of the 19671983 period, however, is that legal scholarship may not provide a very
good guide to the sources of influence on courts. Courts are perhaps
more likely to absorb their attitudes from something that can be called
"public opinion," which in turn is shaped by journalistic and popular
accounts, which in turn may derive ideas from the work of social
scientists. With this possibility in mind, let us then turn (at least momentarily) from the jumble of perspectives reflected in the legal literature and ask what is happening to the social science literature on
political institutions in the 1980s.
What we find is that something called public choice theory is
clearly ascendent. To be sure, public choice theory traces its origins
back at least to the 1950s, when Kenneth Arrow published his book
on social choice theory10 7 and Anthony Downs published An Economic Theory of Democracy.10 8 Major refinements were then offered
in the 1960s by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, 10 9 Mancur O1son, 110 and others. In the 1970s, however, the volume of public choice
literature produced by political scientists and economists started to
take off,"' and shows no signs of abating. Today, even political scientists hostile to the public choice movement concede that it has become
105. For overviews, see Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987); Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the
Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysisof Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1996). See
also Symposium, The Legacy of the New Deal: Problems and Possibilitiesin the Administrative
State, 92 YALE L.J. 1083 (1983) (twenty articles and commentaries reflecting a wide diversity of
perspectives on the current state of administrative law and divergent prognostications about the
future).
106. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1276 (1984) (critical legal studies framework); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the
Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994) (strict originalist framework); Seidenfeld,
supra note 92 (civic republican framework).
107. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951).
108. ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).
109. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962).
110. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
111.

For an overview, see Robert G. Noll, Government Regulatory Behavior: A Multidis-

ciplinary Survey and Synthesis, in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 9 (Roger G.
Noll ed., 1985). For comprehensive bibliographies, see DONALD C. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO,
PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 205-232 (1994); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC
CHOICE II 466-504 (1989).
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the most influential school of thought in modern political science
112
departments.
In the social science literature of the 1970s and 1980s there is no
sharp analytical break between capture theory and public choice theory; indeed, what I call capture theory would be regarded today as a

quaint species of public choice theory. 113 Yet for our purposes there
are very important differences between the Naderite capture theory of
the 1970s and the public choice perspective of the 1980s. Capture the-

ory, at least in the form familiar to judges and legal academics in the
1970s, was about the disproportionate influence of one type of
group-business or producer groups-and focused almost exclusively

on the influence that this type of group wielded over one governmental institution-the administrative agency. In contrast, mature public
choice theory, as it emerged in economics and political science depart-

ments in the 1980s, works with a far more general model of governmental action that disregards these implicit limitations. Modern
public choice theory regards all organized groups demanding services
from political institutions-including not just business and producer
groups, but also environmental groups, labor unions, civil rights
groups, and rent control activists-as being subject to a unitary logic
of collective action. And modern public choice theory regards not just
administrative agencies but also legislatures, the President, and to an
increasing degree even the courts, as institutions that should be
modeled on the assumption that they seek to maximize their own self-

interested ends in the way they respond to these multifarious groups.
Although most often deployed in the service of positive or descriptive analysis of the behavior of political institutions, modern pub-

lic choice theory has profound (if often unstated) normative
implications. 1 4 It suggests that wherever possible, collective ordering
of social phenomena should be transferred from governmental institu-

tions to the market or to "market-mimicking" forms of regulation.
112. See Lowi, supra note 28.
113. An interesting exchange between John Wiley and Matt Spitzer over antitrust federalism
captures this evolution in understanding perfectly. Wiley explains the Supreme Court's expansion of antitrust scrutiny of businesses regulated by state and local governments in the mid-1970s
in terms of capture theory, which Wiley understands to mean disproportionate influence by producer groups. Wiley, supra note 71, at 715. Spitzer, who has a Ph.D. in economics and is a
prominent purveyor of modem public choice theory, criticizes Wiley on the ground that the logic
of organizational influence he invokes extends to a far wider array of groups that may act in an
anti-competitive fashion, including, for example, consumers seeking rent controls. Matthew L.
Spitzer, Antitrust Federalism and Rational Choice PoliticalEconomy: A Critique of Capture Theory, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1302-18 (1988).
114. See generally MASHAW, supra note 31 (developing this point).
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And where some form of government intervention remains necessary,
it suggests that the proper inquiry is a comparative analysis to see
which institution is the "least worst" in providing the needed services
in the inevitably flawed fashion. 115 Either way, the effect of the analysis is to encourage cynicism about governmental institutions, and to
promote hostility toward any invocation of the coercive powers of the
state. In a word, those who have thoroughly assimilated public choice
analysis tend to be libertarians.
How the rise of academic public choice theory in the 1980s eventually translated into journalistic accounts and public opinion is a
story that remains to be told. 116 However, I agree with Jerry
Mashaw's assessment that somewhere along the line just such a translation took place.
While not cast in the same technical jargon, the basic views of the
public choice fraternity are replicated in popular discourse. The
idea that politicians, administrators, 'public interest groups,' and the
like are just 'in it for themselves' has become a staple of political
belief ....Since 1970, presidential election campaigns have tended
to be waged not on issues of policy but on competing claims concerning who will be better at limiting public spending, reducing 'the
deficit,' and downsizing the 'bureaucracy.' These campaigns have
responded to a strong and growing sentiment in the populace that
government
is bloated, unresponsive, ineffectual-and often
117
corrupt.
Mashaw adds that "[w]hile making government better so that it can do
more still animates some, reform has recently come to mean limiting
the damage that public institutions can do or, if possible, dismantling
11 8
them in favor of market solutions.
Not surprisingly, when we turn to legal scholarship it is also possible to discern the spreading influence of the public choice perspective-even in work that explicitly adopts some alternative normative
framework. 1 19 For some legal scholars, their first exposure was
through a series of provocative articles by Frank Easterbrook, written
before he became a judge, applying the Arrow theorem and the inter115. See KOMESAR, supra note 43, at 204.
116. For a recent journalistic account of American government and institutions that adopts
an extreme public choice perspective, see JONATHAN RAUCH, DEMOSCLEROSIS: THE SILENT
KILLER OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1994).
117. MASHAW, supra note 31, at 23-24.
118. Id.
119. See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the Future of Public-Choice-Influenced Legal Scholarship, 50 VAND. L. REV. 647, 659-660 (1997) (reviewing MAXWELL L.
STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY (1997)) (noting
that "[it was not until the mid-1970s that legal scholars first explored the implication of public
choice" but since then "public choice has taken the legal literature by storm.").
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est group theory of politics to the behavior and practices of judges. 120
Others may have encountered the theory by following debates over
the work of Richard Epstein, who gained notoriety by relying on the
interest group theory of politics to justify a revival of Lochner-style
judicial review. 121 By the mid-1980s, the theory was impossible to ignore. Several important law review symposiums featured public
choice theory; 122 accessible summaries of the literature quickly
23
followed.
The rapid spread of public choice arguments unquestionably has
had a strong impact on administrative law scholarship. Many prominent administrative law scholars have wrestled with public choice theory in their work, among them Harold Bruff, Daniel Farber, Jerry
Mashaw, Richard Pierce, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Matthew Spitzer,
Maxwell Stearns, Peter Strauss, and Cass Sunstein. Although there
are of course competing interdisciplinary influences, it is safe to say
that public choice theory has had by far the most extensive and transforming impact on mainstream administrative law scholarship overall.
The prolific Cass Sunstein provides an instructive illustration of
how modern administrative law scholars can reject the normative position generally associated with public choice theory (deregulation),
and yet still be strongly influenced by public choice analysis. Much of
Sunstein's work is concerned with finding ways to promote governmental decisionmaking that reflects a deliberative, civic republican
search for the public interest or "public values."' 2 4 Yet Sunstein
clearly views this as a heroic, almost desperate struggle against the
inherent tendencies of the administrative state. He believes that the
pursuit of narrow self interest and a civic republican style of decisionmaking are locked in a continuing struggle for the hearts and minds of
legislators and agency administrators. But he admits that "there is
mounting evidence that the pluralist understanding captures a signifi120. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court].
121. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985); Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI.
L. REV. 703 (1984).

122. See Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988); Symposium
on Post-ChicagoLaw and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (1989); Symposium, Positive Political Theory and Public Law (pts. 1 & 2), 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 1737 (1992).
123. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 41; MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND
PUBLIC LAW (1997).
124. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV.
29 (1985).
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cant component of the legislative process and that, at the descriptive
level, it is far superior to its competitors. ' 125 Thus, Sunstein's understanding of the way the administrative state actually operates, as opposed to how it ideally should operate, is largely a product of public
12 6
choice scholarship.
Although public choice theory has penetrated deeply into modern administrative law writing, any judge who cared to wade into this
literature would come away with no clear program for administrative
common law. Public choice scholarship reveals no consensus about
the implications of the theory for critical questions involving the administrative state. For example, public choice scholars are divided
about whether administrative agencies should be regarded as being
primarily controlled by the legislature or the executive, or whether
they should be modeled as having policy preferences independent of
those of the major political branches.12 7 They are also divided over
whether broad delegations of power to agencies will increase or decrease rent-seeking behavior in the political system, relative to what
we would observe if Congress decided more issues itself.12 8 Finally,
they are divided over whether intrusive judicial review of agency action, for example through independent interpretations of statutory
mandates, would increase or decrease rent-seeking or other pathologies, relative to what we would observe if courts deferred to agency
interpretations. 129
The uncertain implications of public choice theory applies also to
courts. The proper role of the courts from the perspective of public
choice thinking is a matter of considerable debate. In the late 1970s, a
number of legal scholars influenced by public choice theory hypothesized that common law courts, like the market, are a decentralized
source of social control that has an innate tendency to reach socially
desirable outcomes. 130 This image of the courts encouraged some
125. Id. at 48.
126. In addition to his Stanford Law Review article, see also CAss R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE
RiGTrrs REVOLUTION (1990); Sunstein, supra note 29, at 483; Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and
the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 177.
127. For discussion, see Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and
Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431
(1989).
128. Compare Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (1983), with Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985).
129. See Elhauge, supra note 41.
130. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient
Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977).
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scholars to offer a set of prescriptions, the tenor of which was "sanguine, and at times utopian, in believing that courts can perfect the
political process by interpreting statutes and constitutions and reviewing administrative agency decisions in order to cabin noxious interest
'131

group influence."
More recently, however, it has been argued that the same factors

that public choice theory identifies as undermining our confidence in
legislative and administrative decisionmaking also apply to judicial

decisionmaking.132 Specifically, courts may be subject to cycling as
much as agencies or legislatures, 133 and the forces of minoritarian bias

will strongly influence, if not the outcomes reached, then at least what
issues are presented to courts for their consideration. 134 Thus, public
choice theory, in its current incarnation, does not appear to constitute
the clear mandate for the transfer of decisional authority from legisla-

tures and agencies to courts that some early devotees imagined. This
skepticism about judicial activism has been reinforced by numerous
case studies highlighting the unintended consequences of heightened
judicial review during the 1967-83 period. 135 Among these conse-

quences is the "ossification" of the rulemaking process, in effect defeating the very objectives that the reformers of 1967-1983 were
136
striving to achieve.
Any judge who conscientiously scoured this literature would be
unlikely to respond any differently than a judge who had simply adsorbed today's general climate of pessimism about government: the
response would be one of deep skepticism about all government insti131. Rodriguez, supra note 29, at 111 (citing examples).
132. See KOMESAR, supra note 43, at 123-50; Elhauge, supra note 41, passim.
133. See Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, supra note 120.
134. See KOMESAR, supra note 43, at 123-150. For some qualifications on this insight, see
Thomas W. Merrill, InstitutionalChoice and PoliticalFaith,22 J.L. & Soc. INO. (forthcoming Fall
1997) (reviewing NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES (1994)).
135. For an overview, see R. Shep Meinick, Administrative Law and BureaucraticReality, 44
ADMIN. L. REV. 245 (1992). As Melnick's own study of judicial review under the Clean Air Act
concluded: "Ironically, while the new administrative law [of 1967-1983] was in part a response to
academic critiques of bureaucratic policymaking, the courts' attempt to alleviate the shortcomings of administrative agencies has attracted a spotlight revealing similar defects in judicial decisionmaking." MELNICK, supra note 92, at 343-44. Similar conclusions have been reached with
respect to judicial review of OSHA workplace safety regulations, see JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE
DILEMMA OF Toxic SUBSTANCE REGULATION: How OVERREGULATION CAUSES UNDERREGULATION AT OSHA 115-122 (1988) and with respect to judicial review of automobile safety standards, see JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990).
136. See Harold J. Krent, Reviewing Agency Action for Inconsistency with PriorRules and
Regulations, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1187 (1997); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process,41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways
to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 (1995).
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tutions, combined with very little sense that judges have any tools that
allow them to do something about it.
III.

CHANGING JUDICIAL DOCTRINES

In this section, I will consider a variety of judicial doctrines, some
directly implicating the interpretation of the APA, others more properly regarded as administrative common law. The point of the discussion in each case is to show that the outcomes the courts have reached
in each of my three eras are roughly congruent with what one might
expect given the changing conceptions of the administrative state
sketched in Parts I and II. I am not claiming that direct causal linkage
can be shown between changing notions about the administrative state
and any particular decision. The only claim is that the larger aggregate pattern provides support for the hypothesis that the administrative law developed by courts reflects the influence of the foregoing
changes in the dominant conception of the administrative state.
A.

Availability of Review

One set of doctrines of obvious import are those that regulate
access to court to complain about, or obtain enforcement of, administrative action. I will consider three such doctrines here-standing, reviewability, and implied private rights of action-although there are
others that also reveal similar patterns. 137 In each case, one would
expect access to courts to serve as a barometer of the different conceptions of the administrative state adumbrated above. The public in137. Three obvious additional candidates are primary jurisdiction, exhaustion, and sovereign
immunity. With respect to primary jurisdiction, compare United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352
U.S. 59, 63-69 (1956) (primary jurisdiction doctrine requires resort to commission for interpretation of tariff), with Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 305-07 (1976) (primary jurisdiction does not require resort to commission to determine whether common law right of action
exists for airline passenger (Ralph Nader no less!) bumped from flight pursuant to overbooking
practice), with Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 130-31 (1990) (primary jurisdiction doctrine enforced even if disavowed by agency). With respect to exhaustion,
compare Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 51 (1938) (administrative exhaustion required even for allegation that agency was acting unconstitutionally beyond its jurisdiction), with McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 197 (1969) (administrative exhaustion not
required when Selective Service determined individual was eligible for draft and issue was purely
one of statutory interpretation), with Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 153-54 (1993) (exhaustion
of discretionary right of appeal within agency not required by the "plain meaning" of the APA).
With respect to sovereign immunity, compare Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,
337 U.S. 682, 703-05 (1949) (broad conception of sovereign immunity invoked to deny relief),
with Schlafly v. Volpe, 495 F.2d 273, 280-81 (7th Cir. 1974) (APA interpreted to constitute a
broad waiver of sovereign immunity even for suit that would compel expenditure of funds by the
government), with United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1992) (waiver of
sovereign immunity must be set forth expressly in text of statute).

19971

CAPTURE THEORY AND THE COURTS: 1967-1983

terest conception dominant from 1946 to 1966 should produce a fairly
restrictive set of access rules, providing recourse to courts only for
those most directly injured by the administrative process, and discouraging access by "officious bystanders" likely to distract agency experts
from the business at hand. Capture theory, in contrast, should yield a
vastly expanded notion of judicial access, encouraging public interest
intervenors and other underrepresented parties to go to court and
blow the whistle on agencies that have been captured by big business
or are otherwise succumbing to bureaucratic pathologies. Public
choice theory, on the other hand, should undermine the confidence
that expanded access is an unqualified good thing. Indeed, if public
choice theory leads to the insight that judicial action is also likely to be
affected by minoritarian bias, then one possible judicial response
might be a quest for more formal and "law-like" criteria for granting
or refusing access to different groups, in order to constrain the discretion of lower courts in responding to such interest group entreaties.
1.

Standing

One important common law doctrine provides that individuals or
groups may invoke the powers of the courts to set aside agency action
only if they have "standing to sue." In considering the evolving contours of this doctrine over the last fifty years, what we see is strikingly
consistent with the expected pattern.
The APA was widely regarded as having codified the law of
standing in effect prior to its adoption. 138 It provided that individuals
were entitled to judicial review of agency action if they had "suffer[ed]
legal wrong because of agency action," or alternatively, if they were
"adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
of a relevant statute."'1 39 The "legal wrong" test was most commonly
understood to refer to the situation where the agency action, if not
legally warranted, would constitute an injury to a recognized common
law right of liberty or property. 140 The alternative test referred to situations where Congress had created a cause of action allowing certain
"adversely affected or aggrieved" parties to sue even though they had
138. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 96 (1947); JAFFE, supra note 79, at 528-31.
139. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
140. See Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137, 140 (1939). Admittedly,
other cases seemed to give the phrase a broader and more ambiguous signification. See, e.g., The
Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 267 (1924).
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not suffered an injury recognized at common law. 141 From 1946 to
1967, the courts interpreted Section 702 of the APA more or less consistently with this original understanding. 142
Then, starting in the late 1960s, the courts of appeals began to
manipulate the second test ("adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute") by creatively
interpreting individual regulatory statutes as incorporating an intention to permit nontraditional intervenors to seek judicial review. 143
Professor Sunstein has speculated, consistently with the thesis of this
article, that these decisions were a response to "empirical literature"
suggesting that agencies are often prone to capture, and hence that
regulated entities would have disproportionate influence over agencies if the beneficiaries of these statutes (i.e., public interest intervenors) were not permitted to challenge agency decisions in Court. 144
Soon, the Supreme Court had a chance to ratify these lower court
decisions; instead, it took it upon itself to re-write the APA provisions
on standing. In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp, 14 5 the Court in effect jettisoned the "legal wrong" test,

even though it is set forth in the text of the APA. 146 Henceforth, the
Court indicated, the only questions would be whether the claimant is
sufficiently "aggrieved" to establish a "case" or "controversy" within
the meaning of Article III of the Constitution, and whether "the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.' 1 4 7
The net effect of this rewriting was to transform the APA standing provisions from a screen against bystander suits into an open
sieve. No longer did one have to show injury to a common law right
or the existence of a special legislatively created cause of action. It
was enough to show some connection to the government decision be-

141. The leading cases were Scripps-HowardRadio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942) and FCC
v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
142. See, e.g., Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924, 932-33 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955).
143. See Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 932-37 (2d Cir.
1968); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1000-06
(D.C. Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 615-17 (2d Cir.
1965).
144. Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article
Ill, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 183-84 (1992).
145. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
146. Id. at 153.
147. Id.
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ing challenged and to make arguments bearing some relationship to a
federal regulatory scheme. Ensuing decisions made clear that public
interest groups could readily obtain standing under these standards;
for example, environmental plaintiffs could establish standing merely
by pleading that they use the natural area in controversy for recrea148
tional purposes.
The move toward liberalization of standing eventually crested,
however, and by the mid-to-late 1980s a correction set in. 1 49 The
three most important recent decisions for APA purposes have all been
authored by Justice Scalia. In Lujan 1,150 the Court held that environmental plaintiffs must pinpoint the exact area they use for recreational
purposes, and can challenge agency action only insofar as it affects
that area.15 1 In Lujan 11,152 the Court ruled that environmental plaintiffs must allege that they intend "imminently" to visit the area in con153 Most
troversy, not that they intend to do so in the indefinite future.
recently, in Bennett v. Spear,15 4 the Court held that landowners have
standing under the APA to challenge an agency decision taken under
the Endangered Species Act that might deprive them of water to irri1 55
gate their lands.
Taken together, the three recent decisions suggest an effort to
move the law of standing back in the direction of protecting common
law interests, as under the discarded "legal wrong" test. Thus, the
standing of environmentalists is limited to situations where they have
experienced a direct "assault" on their senses, in the form of environmental depredations that occur in their presence while they are recreating outdoors. This suggests a desire to conform the circumstances in
which environmentalists have standing to the paradigm of a common
law tort. 15 6 Private property owners, in contrast, are allowed to chal148. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669, 683-90 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-41 (1972).
149. For an overview of the manifold developments in standing law during these years see
Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309,
404-459 (1995); William Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, passim (1988).
150. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
151. Id. at 889.
152. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
153. Id. at 564.
154. 117 S.Ct. 1154 (1997).
155. Id. at 1160-69.
156. See also Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social
Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1320-1323 (1995) (noting the analogy between tort law and modern standing doctrine). Steams offers an explanation for the constriction of standing under recent cases based on public choice theory that is different than that suggested here. He attributes
the doctrine to the Court's perception that premature adjudication of issues should be avoided in
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lenge agency action that more remotely threatens their land with potential future harm. Private property owners, however, are obviously
seeking to protect a common law right, and hence recognizing their
standing to contest more remote and contingent injuries is fully compatible with a world view that generally privileges private rights recognized at common law over statutory causes of action ("public rights").
Still, none of the three recent decisions abandons the framework
for APA standing established in the 1970s. If there has been a retrenchment, it has been a modest one. And although it is possible to
interpret the Court's recent cases as evidencing a preference for "old
property" rights over "new property" regulatory entitlements, it may
also be that the Court has gravitated to a more common-law like doctrine simply because it seems more "law like" and hence apolitical and
predictive than the open-ended formulations of the middle era.
2.

Reviewability

Another threshold doctrine that has an important influence on
the balance of authority between agencies and courts concerns what
kinds of agency decisions are judicially reviewable. The APA makes
reviewable any "final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court" 157 subject to two exceptions: where "statutes
preclude judicial review" or where "agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law." 158 During the first twenty years under the
APA, the Court applied these provisions with no presumption either
for or against the reviewability of agency action.1 59
In 1967, however, the Court "announced a major doctrinal
change in the law governing review of agency action. ' 160 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner16 1 stated that henceforth the APA would be regarded as incorporating a presumption in favor of reviewability, and
that "only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should courts restrict access to judicial review."'1 62 Subsequent decisions indicated that the Court was indeed
committed to expanding the domain of issues subject to judicial reorder to prevent having outcomes determined by path dependency, given that preferences
among the Justices are often multi-peaked. Id. passim.
157. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994).
158. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1), (a)(2).
159. See 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 127 (3d ed. 1994).
160. Id. at 127.
161. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
162. Id. at 141.

CAPTURE THEORY AND THE COURTS: 1967-1983

19971

view. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 163 the Court
held that the decision of the Department of Transportation to authorize funding for a highway was reviewable at the behest of a citizens
group. 164 And in Dunlop v. Bachowski, 65 the Court held reviewable
a decision by the Labor Department not to fie a civil action against a
166
union that allegedly had violated federal union election laws.
Lower courts, not surprisingly, took these decisions as a signal to subject a larger range of administrative action to judicial oversight. For
example, older precedents holding that adverse decisions of the
United State Parole Board were not reviewable were abandoned, and
167
a rule of reviewability of parole denials was adopted in its place.
In 1984, a backlash of sorts set in. In Block v. Community Nutrition Institute,168 the Supreme Court stated that Abbott Laboratories
did not require "'clear and convincing' evidence ... in the strict evidentiary sense."'1 69 Instead, the Court explained, the question was
whether "congressional intent to preclude judicial review is 'fairly discernible"' in the details of the legislative scheme. 170 Based on its
analysis of the legislative scheme, the Court held that milk-marketing
orders issued by the Secretary of Agriculture were not reviewable at
the behest of a consumer group complaining of higher prices. 171 Community Nutrition thus holds unreviewable (at least by consumers) an
administrative decision that reflects the very paradigm of "agency capture" that so exercised the previous generation of judges.
The next year, in Heckler v. Chaney, 172 the Court recognized an
even more striking exception to reviewability, holding that agency decisions not to institute enforcement proceedings are presumptively unreviewable.' 73 The Court reasoned that decisions not to enforce are
based on a complicated balancing of multiple factors; that agency inaction does not involve the exercise of coercive powers over individuals; and that decisions not to enforce are analogous to decisions not to
163.
164.
165.
166.

401 U.S. 402 (1971).
Id. at 409-13.
421 U.S. 560 (1975).
Id. at 566-67.

167. See

KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 632-633
THE SEVENTIES] (collecting decisions).

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

467 U.S. 340 (1984).
Id. at 350-51.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 352-53.
470 U.S. 821 (1985).
Id. at 827-38.

(1976) [hereinafter

SUPPLEMENTING

DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF
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prosecute, which were traditionally regarded as unreviewable at com174
mon law.
Chaney in particular appears to reflect a very different world view
than Overton Park and Bachowski. The decisions of the middle era
proceed on the assumption that judicial review is nearly always a
healthy corrective to agency action or inaction. Chaney, in contrast,
assumes that as long as the agency is not regulating, that is, as long as
it is not intruding into private or market relationships, then there is no
need for judicial intervention. Thus, it is not too far-fetched to read
Chaney as reflecting a preference for market orderingl 75-the one domain presumed by public choice theory to be free of pathologies like
minoritarian bias.
Later decisions have continued the trend toward greater restrictiveness in permitting judicial review. 176 As in the case of standing
doctrine, however, there has been no wholesale repudiation of the
new learning of the 1967-1983 period. The Court has occasionally
found agency action reviewable in contested cases, 177 and the lower
178
courts have applied the new exceptions to reviewability unevenly.
Overall, what we find is a loss of faith in the unequivocal value of
judicial review, which translates into a pattern of general drift in the
doctrine coupled with moderate retrenchment and adoption of common law formalisms in selected areas.
3. Implied Private Rights of Action
A third doctrine that has an important influence on the respective
sphere of influence of agencies and courts is one that permits the beneficiaries of a regulatory regime to go directly to court to obtain enforcement of a regulatory statute, typically by suing another private
party for damages for violating the beneficiary's regulatory rights.
The APA does not mention this possibility, but instead proceeds on
the assumption that all actions in court will be between the government and private citizens. Consistent with this understanding, rela174. Id. at 831-32.
175. See Cass Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Cm. L.
REV. 653, 666 (1985).
176. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993) (termination of children's health program
by Indian Health Service not reviewable).
177. See, e.g., Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986) (narrowly interpreting preclusion of review provision to permit judicial review of agency
regulations).
178. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157 (1996) (discussing the lower courts' application of the Chaney exception).
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tively few decisions recognizing implied private rights of action can be
found from 1945 to the mid-1960s. 179 The Supreme Court in particular tended to reject arguments in favor of implied private rights of

action, especially where such an action was perceived as interfering
with an administrative agency's exclusive policymaking authority. 180
The attitude changed dramatically in the 1960s, perhaps some-

what earlier than with respect to the other innovations in administrative common law under consideration. The watershed case was J.L
Case Co. v. Borak,18 1 in which the Court permitted investors to bring

a private action for damages against companies who issue proxy statements containing false or misleading information in violation of federal securities laws.1 82 Borak itself was probably motivated more by a
version of the public interest theory than by capture theory. The deci-

sion was justified primarily in terms of the need to supplement the
inadequate resources of the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") for reviewing proxy statements. 183 The SEC told the Court
that it was incapable of uncovering fraud given the volume of filings
and the short time for review, and the agency itself enthusiastically
endorsed the idea of supplementing regulatory oversight with a private cause of action in order to "make effective the congressional
84
purpose."1
Whatever the motivations for the decision, lower courts in the
latter part of the 1960s and early 1970s seized on the precedent as

justification for creating new implied rights of action in a host of areas. l8 5 When the Court in 1975 adopted a four-prong "test" for determining in any case whether it was appropriate to create an implied
179. One commentator has found that while decisions recognizing implied fights of action
were not unheard of during these years, the Court-operating in the Legal Process traditionrequired a showing that such a fight would be necessary to effectuate the purposes of a statutory
scheme. H. Miles Foy, III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Rights of
Action in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 557-561 (1986).
180. See T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959) (no implied right of action to
challenge the reasonableness of past motor carrier rates); Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951) (same-gas rates); cf. Hewitt-Robins Inc. v. Eastern
Freightways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84 (1962) (T.I.M.E., Inc. distinguished because at issue was shipper's
choice of route, not rates charged). In the lower courts, securities legislation was the "most
fruitful source of implied rights of action." Note, Implying Civil Remedies from FederalRegulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REV. 285, 286 (1963).
181. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
182. Id. at 430-31.
183. Id. at 432.
184. Id. at 433.
185. See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programsand Private Rights, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1196 (1982) ("[a]fter the Supreme Court enthusiastically endorsed this
form of federal common law in its 1964 decision in J.L Case Co. v. Borak, lower federal courts
recognized private rights of action under regulatory statutes with increasing frequency").
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private action, 186 the volume of lower court litigation increased even
187
further.
In the early 1980s, the wave of implied rights of action suddenly
crested. Writing in 1982, Professors Stewart and Sunstein reported "a
sharp reversal" in the Supreme Court's attitude. As they characterized it, "[t]he Supreme Court has all but repudiated Borak and has
created a strong presumption against judicial recognition of private
rights of action. ' 188 The reversal took the form of a de-emphasis on
the four-part test of Cort v. Ash in favor of an inquiry that focused on
congressional intent.1 89 This shift in emphasis, however, did not entirely staunch the flow of new implied private rights of action-lower
courts were reasonably adept at discovering "intentions" to create
such actions in broad statements about the purposes of statutes and in
statements made by the proponents of regulation in the legislative
history. 190
Certain Justices wanted to go further, and would have abolished
implied rights of action altogether. Justice Powell voiced his opposition to implied private rights of action in the form of a separation of
powers argument. 19' He argued that determining the available remedies for the enforcement of a federal statute is a fundamental policy
192
choice that should be made by Congress rather than by the courts.
Later, Justice Scalia took up the crusade, and sharpened the argument. 193 As he noted, only those proposals concerning remedies that
have received the approval of both Houses of Congress and the assent
of the President should be regarded as law; "implied" remedies cannot
claim to have surmounted this arduous process. 94 The Powell-Scalia
position can be seen as reflecting an implicit public choice conception
186. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
187. At least this is my impression based on the number of Supreme Court opinions and the
volume of scholarly commentary devoted to the issue in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
188. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 185, at 1196.
189. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981);
see, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
190. See, e.g., Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 826 F.2d 1470, 1474-76 (6th Cir. 1987) (recognizing implied right of action under section 13(e) of Securities Act of 1934); Meyer v. Oppenheimer Management Corp., 764 F.2d 76, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1985) (recognizing implied right of action
under Investment Company Act); Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Jackson
Transit Auth., 650 F.2d 1379, 1383-87 (6th Cir. 1981) (recognizing implied right of action under
section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act).
191. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 742-49 (Powell, J. dissenting).
192. Id. at 748-49.
193. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
194. Id.
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of the administrative state. Unlike the Court in Borak, which viewed
the securities acts as serving the public interest, the Powell-Scalia arguments presuppose that the legislative process is based on com-

promises between contending interest groups, with one critical
element of the compromise being the package of enforcement tools

given to beneficiaries. Under this conception of legislation, for courts
to step in and create a new remedy in addition to the compromise
package would upset the original interest group "deal," and give one

contending group more than it was able to obtain through interest195

group bargaining.
Although never embraced by a majority of the Court, the PowellScalia position has in effect become the law of the land. 196 Disputes

about implied rights of action that reach the Court today almost all
involve appeals to stare decisis or congressional ratification of prior
judicial decisions. 197 The creation of wholly new implied rights of action has largely passed from the scene. 198 Once again, we see a famil-

iar pattern: expansion of judicial oversight has stopped, but the
innovations of the prior era have not been fully repudiated. Mean-

while, the style of judicial decisionmaking has become more formal,
with any discussion about furthering the purposes of statutes or rein-

forcing important public policies a fading memory.

195. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 85, 112-15
(spelling out this argument).
196. The story of how this happened is very curious, and remains to be told. Justice Powell's
separation of powers argument was expressly rejected by a majority of the Court. See Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 375-378 (1982). Similarly, the Court
has not endorsed Justice Scalia's argument based on the presentment and bicamerialism requirements. See Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610-12 n.4 (1991) (expressly
rejecting Justice Scalia's call to abandon any reliance on legislative history). Yet the position
they both urged-abandoning the practice of recognizing new implied rights of action-has in
effect become the position that best explains the outcomes reached by the Court.
197. See Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 116 S. Ct. 1186, 1198-1206 (1996) (recognizing an
implied right of action under section 10 of Voting Rights Act based on precedent that recognized
such an action under section 5 of the Act); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
380-87 (1983) (relying on congressional ratification of implied action under Rule 10b-5); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378-88 (1982) (relying on congressional ratification of implied right of action under Commodities Exchange Act); cf. Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 65-76 (1992) (recognizing that where an implied right
of action for injunctive relief had been previously recognized by the Court, action for damages
was also appropriate).
198. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 190 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting
that in nine of last eleven Supreme Court cases in which the Court was asked to recognize an
implied right of action, the Court had declined to do so); see e.g., Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347
(1992); Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527 (1989).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

B.

[Vol. 72:1039

Scope of Review

When we turn from doctrines determining the availability of judicial review to those that define the degree to which courts will substitute their judgments for those of the agency, we discover a somewhat
more complicated pattern. Nevertheless, the three-part sequence of
development is clearly discernible, as is the plausible relationship between this development and the underlying conceptions of the admin-

istrative state I have posited.
1. Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Law

In cases where judicial review is available, it is clear today that
statutory interpretation is the most important variable in determining
the allocation of authority between agencies and courts. If courts can
freely substitute their judgments for those of the agency about the
meaning of the statutes the agency implements, then the courts will
have significant power in determining the direction of agency policy.

On the other hand, if the courts defer to agency interpretations in
most cases, then the agency will be relatively free (at least as far as

judicial interference is concerned) to chart its own course.
The issue today is debated largely in terms of the Chevron

formula, 199 which strikes a compromise of sorts between the two extremes. Courts will substitute their judgment for agencies where they
can discern a clearly preferred answer to the question presented using

"traditional tools of statutory construction. ' '200 Otherwise, courts will
defer to agency determinations as long as the agency's interpretation
can be said to be "permissible" or "reasonable." ' 20 1 Stimulated by the

appearance of this new formula, the general question of when courts
199. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In
case the reader has forgotten the two-step formula, this is it:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.
Id. at 842-43 (citations omitted).
200. Id. at 843 n.9.
201. Id. at 843-44.
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should defer to agency interpretations of statutes has become the most
20 2
hotly contested issue in administrative law.
Looking back over fifty years, it is striking to realize that it has
not always been so. During the first twenty years under the APA,
relatively few cases ventured strong views about the division of interpretational authority between agencies and courts. There was some
commentary in the law reviews, 20 3 but it was intermittent, and the issue was clearly not perceived as burning or urgent. In the middle period, which I have fixed as 1967-1983, there was, if anything, even less
attention in judicial decisions and commentary given to the division of
interpretational authority. The first question that needs to be answered, therefore, is why what we today regard as the most important
question in administrative law had such low visibility during the first
two periods under review.
One reason the question was avoided is that it was embarrassing.
Both the APA and the received tradition that modeled administrative
law on the relationship between judge and jury suggested that courts
should decide all questions of law de novo. Indeed, the APA appears
to compel this conclusion. It provides that "[t]o the extent necessary
to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning and applicability of the terms of any
agency action. '20 4 It further provides that courts shall hold unlawful
and set aside agency action found to be "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right. ' 20 5 On the
other hand, the Act says that the reviewing court shall hold unlawful
and set aside agency action found to be a "arbitrary, capricious, and
an abuse of discretion," 20 6 suggesting that reviewing courts are to defer to agency determinations when they constitute reasonable exercises of "discretion." Overall, the review provisions of the APA
appear to presuppose that issues of law interpretation are for courts,
while courts are to defer to agencies when they exercise their discretion, i.e., when they are not constrained by law.
The judicial doctrine therefore started out in 1946 against a baseline of understanding that quite arguably required de novo judicial
202.
L. REV.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT
1253 (1997).
See, e.g., Louis Jaffe, JudicialReview: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 239 (1955).
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994) (emphasis added).
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
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review of all questions of law. Such a baseline was substantially at
odds with the public interest conception of the administrative state,
because it would impose a significant straightjacket on agencies in formulating policy within their areas of expertise. Not surprisingly,
therefore, courts tip-toed around the general question of the division
of court-agency authority, looking for ways to give agencies greater
breathing space while avoiding open defiance of the APA. One common avoidance device, reflected in the leading pre-APA decision
NLRB v. Hearst Publications,Inc.,20 7 was to characterize agency de-

terminations of law as being merely the "application" of law to facts,
and hence as coming within the standard for review of discretionary
decisionmaking.20 8 Another move, reflected for example in the second Chenery decision,20 9 was to assert that the statutory language is
sufficiently broad as to admit multiple interpretations, and to uphold
the agency's decision as an exercise of expertise in making the "discretionary" choice among different interpretative options. 210 The later
move, as Justice Jackson noted in dissent, is directly contrary to the
principle that "what action is, and what is not, within the law must be
determined by courts .... 211

Somewhat more puzzling is the continued silence about the subject during the second era, when courts in general were intruding
much more aggressively into the administrative process. One might
expect such an atmosphere to produce a "rediscovery" of the language of the APA suggesting that courts must review all questions of
law de novo. This would have given the courts an extremely powerful
weapon in forcing agencies into line. But this did not happen. 212 Instead, the courts as before studiously ignored the language of the
APA, and continued to avoid any sweeping pronouncements on the
subject.

207. 322 U.S. 111, 130-32 (1944).
208. See 4 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 189-213 (1st ed. 1958)
(reviewing decisions that cast questions of law as questions of law application or fact in order to
defer to agency action).
209. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
210. Id. at 207-08.
211. Id. at 213-14 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
212. In fact, Senator Dale Bumpers proposed an amendment to the APA in the mid-1970s
that would have expressly commanded courts to decide all issues of statutory interpretation de
novo. See Carl McGowan, Congress, Court, and Controlof DelegatedPower, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
1119, 1162-65 (1977) (discussing the proposed amendment and responses to it). Most administrative law scholars and proponents of the new representation-reinforcing administrative law
opposed the idea. Id. at 1164-65.
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This is confirmed by Kenneth Culp Davis' Administrative Law of
the Seventies,213 an "interim" edition of his Treatise rushed into print

in 1976 to summarize the revolutionary changes in administrative law
then taking place. Although nearly 700 pages in length overall, the
Davis volume contains only six pages on the subject of judicial review
of agency determinations of law. 214 Professor Davis noted that the
decisions of the 1970s reflect a blurring of distinctions thought to be
important in the preceding era-such as the distinction between judicial review of questions of law and of fact, and the distinction between
legislative rules and interpretative rules. Overall, however, his treatment suggests that the dominant judicial attitude was one of indifference to the larger question of the proper allocation of interpretative
power.
This is not to suggest that the intrusive judicial spirit of the age
did not spill over into individual cases involving questions of statutory
interpretation. It is easy to catalogue decisions of the second period in
which courts freely substituted their views of statutory meaning for
those of the agency. The Supreme Court's decisions in Overton
Park,2 15 TVA v. Hill,2 1 6 and the Benzene case 217 come to mind. Moreover, lower courts during this period often used statutory interpretation to override longstanding agency practices such as permitting
clearcutting in national forests 218 or allowing pipelines to be constructed and maintained on public lands.219 There is a theme of sorts
in these decisions: courts occasionally used statutory interpretation to
try to "correct" for perceived agency bias in favor of groups having a
close client relationship to the agency (highway builders in Overton
Park, dam builders in TVA v. Hill, unions in Benzene, the timber in-

dustry, the oil industry, etc.). In other words, courts on occasion used
statutory interpretation to try to correct for agency capture. But the
most striking feature of the era remains the fact that when the courts
213. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES, supra note 167.
214. Id. at 688-693.
215. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, Inc., 401 U.S. 402, 405 (1971) (reading
highway funding act as incorporating a preference for avoiding new construction in parks).
216. 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978) (reading Endangered Species Act as eliminating all discretion
in enforcing the statutory mandate against federal agencies).
217. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607, 614-15
(1980) (plurality opinion) (creatively reading the OHS Act to incorporate a "significant risk"
threshold for regulation of carcinogenic substances).
218. West Virginia Div. of the Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945, 955
(4th Cir. 1975).
219. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 846 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 917 (1973).
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did substitute judgment, they did not assert a general prerogative to
"say what the law is" to the exclusion of the agency.
The fact that courts failed to invoke their power to interpret law
de novo as a source of expanded judicial authority during this period
is highly instructive in understanding the temper of the times. It suggests that the judges of this era did not believe that they had a com-

parative advantage relative to agencies in resolving questions of
policy. What they did believe was that agencies were flawed institutions subject to capture and related pathologies, and that these flaws
could be overcome, at least in part, through the use of improved procedures and more intensive oversight by courts. Thus, the judicial
project was to seek to perfect the administrative process through procedural innovations and heightened review; it was not, for the most
part, to shift the formulation of substantive policy from agencies to
courts.
As is obvious, judicial avoidance of the general question of courtagency relations in interpreting law came to a crashing end during the
third period. The Chevron decision 220 contains what has come to be
regarded as a canonical formulation of the appropriate division of responsibility between agencies and courts. A tremendous amount of
ink has been spilled in assessing the pros and cons of Chevron, and I
do not propose to enlarge the puddle here. I will confine myself to
three observations about how the decision fits into the explanatory
hypothesis under consideration here about the larger evolution of administrative law.
First, there are strong hints of a public choice-like understanding
of the political process in the Court's opinion. In a famous passage
near the end, the Court discusses a number of reasons why Congress
may have failed to include a precise definition of "stationary source"
in the Clean Air Act, the issue that gave rise to the controversy in the
case. 22 1 One possibility, the Court said, was that Congress consciously
wanted the EPA to supply a definition, based on a perception of its
superior expertise-the classic public interest justification for delegation to an agency. 222 Another possibility was that Congress simply
"did not consider the question at this level" 223-the classic justification for delegation based on the impossibility of foreseeing all questions that will arise in the future. A third possibility, however, was
220. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

221. Id. at 865.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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that "Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the
question, and those on each side decided to take their chances with
the scheme devised by the agency" 224-essentially the public choice

explanation for delegation. Immediately after listing these possibilities, the opinion rather chillingly announces: "For judicial purposes, it
'225
matters not which of these things occurred.
Chevron thus acknowledges the possibility of a public choice ex-

planation for political behavior, including now not just administrative
agency behavior but also that of the Congress. And its response to
this possibility is to say that the judicial role must be defined in such a

way as to accommodate this possibility.
Second, Chevron was not born an influential precedent. When
the decision was announced, the Court itself did not appear to believe

it had offered any major restatement of administrative law. 226 And
contemporaneous commentary betrays no sense that the decision had
significantly altered the legal landscape. 227 Rather, it was only when
the lower courts, especially the D.C. Circuit, read Chevron as a canon-

ical pronouncement, 228 and only after Justice Scalia (a former D.C.
Circuit judge) ascended to the high court, that the Court itself began
treating Chevron as the authoritative statement regarding judicial re-

view of administrative interpretations of law. Thus, one must explain
what it is about Chevron-as opposed to dozens of other decisions
that address the same general issue-that made it so compelling for

judges in the third era.
One possibility, of course, is that Chevron became influential be-

cause it required increased deference to agencies in disputes over statutory interpretation, and judges were sympathetic to such a transfer of
decisionmaking authority to agencies. 229 The problem with this expla224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969,
976 (1992).
227. See, e.g., Colin S.Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative Strate, 133 U. PA.
L. REV. 549 (1985) (treating Chevron as simply one more precedent in a long line of decisions).
228. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An EmpiricalStudy
of FederalAdministrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1041-42.
229. Chevron's formula for allocating responsibility between courts and agencies appears, at
least on its face, to represent a tilt away from courts to agencies. Under pre-Chevron law, some
affirmative justification was required for deferring to agency interpretations of law, such as an
express delegation of rulemaking authority to agencies or the existence of a longstanding and
consistent agency understanding. The default rule was independent judicial judgment. Under
the two-step Chevron analysis, in contrast, courts must affirmatively justify a decision to substitute their judgment for agencies, in the form of finding a specific answer to the interpretational
question in conventional statutory interpretation materials. The default rule is now deference.
See Merrill, supra note 226, at 977.
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nation for Chevron's popularity, however, is that there is very little
evidence that Chevron has in fact resulted in greater deference to
agencies. Certainly at the level of the Supreme Court, the evidence is
at best inconclusive. 230 Evidence regarding the D. C. Circuit is similarly mixed. An early study found increased deference to agencies
under Chevron;231 subsequent studies however have found lower rates
23 2
of deference.
A more plausible basis for the popularity of the Chevron formula
lies in its depiction of the courts as performing a narrow, nonpolitical,
lawfinding role in reviewing agency interpretations of statutes. In explaining the rationale for the deference doctrine, Chevron invokes a
sharp distinction between law and politics. Political choices, the opinion suggests, should be made by politically accountable bodies. Ideally, this means Congress; but if not Congress, then such choices be
made, if possible, by administrative agencies rather than courts. The
Court explained: "While agencies are not directly accountable to the
people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this
political branch of Government to make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently
did not resolve, or intently left to be resolved by the agency charged
''233
with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.
In contrast, the Court continued, federal judges "have no constituency;" it is thus their duty when political issues have been left unresolved by Congress "to respect legitimate policy choices made by
'234
those who do."
The narrow, lawfinding role of courts is also implicit in the
Court's statement of the two-step formula. The inquiry at step one "is
the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. '2 35 This suggests a careful scouring of text and legislative history in an effort to discover the "smoking gun" directly on
point. If the telltale evidence is not found, the court shifts to step two,
and upholds the agency interpretation if it is a reasonable one.
230. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH.
U. L.Q. 351, 358-63 (1994).
231. See Schuck & Elliott, supra note 228.
232. See John F. Belcaster, The D.C. Circuit's Use of the Chevron Test: Constructinga Positive Theory of Judicial Obedience and Disobedience, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 745 (1992).
233. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984).
234. Id. at 866.
235. Id. at 842.
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Such a strong distinction between law and politics has deep roots
in our legal culture, of course. But the appeal of such a distinction
may be enhanced once the public choice vision of the administrative
state gains wide currency. One response to such an understanding on
the part of courts is to seek to avoid any appearance that they, like the
political branches, have become the targets of the machinations of interest groups. Chevron offers an escape from this prospect, by allowing courts to disclaim any responsibility for regulatory policy. The
role of the courts is simply to follow the trail of instructions laid down
by Congress. If Congress has left specific instructions about an issue,
then the courts as faithful agents must enforce such instructions. If no
specific instructions can be found, then the courts presume that Congress intended the agency to fill in gaps and resolve ambiguities, and
the courts will accept whatever answer the agency reaches so long as it
is minimally rational. In either case, the role of the courts is simply to
"find" the proper instructions; the court plays no active or creative
role in the process of forming regulatory policy, viewed now as interest group politics.
Third, if one assumes that statutes and regulations are the product of interest group pressure and accidents of timing, then it is foolish
to expect to find any coherence or "comprehensive rationality" in the
law. 236 And in fact Chevron's division of authority has a highly random aspect to it that seems to mirror this underlying chaos. Judicial
power trumps agency power if and only if the court can discern a clear
answer to the precise question of interpretation using traditional interpretational tools. This in turn will depend largely on the fortuity of
whether the drafter of the statute happened to think of the issue and
to insert some language on point, or whether dictionaries show that
the words chosen by the drafter have single or multiple meanings. As
a result, judicial intervention is like Russian roulette: one never knows
in advance when the chamber will fire, but when it does the result will
often be fatal to agency policy. But so what? One more source of
randomness is unlikely to change in any fundamental way a system
that, from a public choice perspective, is essentially random to begin
with.
Contrast this approach to the Legal Process philosophy of the
first era, when courts saw their task as ascertaining the "purpose" of
the statute and whether the agency has remained faithful to it, and
236. See Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigmsin Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV.
393, 396 (1981).
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preserving what Jaffe called "the integrity and coherence of the legal
' 237

system.

Or contrast it with the attitude of second era, when courts

often saw their task as providing a corrective to agency biases or
agency blindness to the public purposes underlying the law. In both
cases, the courts saw themselves as playing a purposive, constructive
role in managing the administrative state. Under Chevron, the courts
see the process of review as more like a game of "gotcha." If the

court can find the right scrap of text or dictionary definitions or the
right structural inference to be drawn from the text, then the agency

loses; otherwise it wins. Either way, the consequences for policy are
2 38

ignored.

2.

Review of Rulemaking

A second issue implicating the scope of review concerns the role

of the courts in reviewing informal rules by agencies, particularly
those that require the agency to resolve contested issues of fact. The
APA, reflecting the conventional views of the day, viewed agencies as
bodies that would behave either like courts or like legislatures. Consequently, when agencies adopted legislative rules, they were to follow
239
procedures modeled on legislative committee hearings.
This legislative-type procedural format created little controversy

during the first twenty years under the APA, when most agencies preferred to make policy by adjudication. 240 But during the 1960s, as
agencies began to expand their range of activities to include such
things as industry-wide rate regulation, 24 1 rulemaking became increasingly popular. With the coming of the environmental revolution in the
237. JAFFE, supra note 79, at 589. See Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregatingthe Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 Sup. CT. REV. 429, 436-42.
238. As one recent commentary puts it, the attitude is: "it's not my job to care [about policy]." Karin P. Sheldon, "It's Not My Job to Care": UnderstandingJustice Scalia's Method of
Statutory Interpretation Through Sweet Home and Chevron, 24 B.C. ENvTL. As. L. REv.487
(1997).
239. First, they were to provide the Federal Register notice of the time, place and nature of
the proceedings, a reference to the legal authority for the proposed rule, and either the terms of
the proposed rule or a description of the subjects involved. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). Next, they were
to give "interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through submission
of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation." 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(c). Finally, after "consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency [was to] incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose" and publish the final rules in the Federal Register. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D), 553(c).
240. See 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 360-61 (1st ed. 1958)
[hereinafter DAVIS, 1 ADMrNISTRATrvE LAW TREATISE].

241. See The Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 768-90 (1968) (FPC could regulate maximum field prices of natural gas by area-wide rulemaking rather than adjudication); FPC
v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 44 (1964) (rate issues resolved in rulemaking may not be relitigated
in subsequent enforcement actions); cf.United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224,
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1970s, agency rulemaking began to take on an even more prominent
role, often by the express direction of Congress.
As rulemaking moved to stage center in administrative law, the
courts in the late 1960s and early 1970s became concerned about
whether agencies would deploy this new tool so as to give adequate
consideration to the interests of the beneficiaries of regulation. Starting in the mid-1960s, the D.C. Circuit began to suggest that additional
procedures beyond those specified in the APA-such as cross examination or an oral hearing-might be required in order to insure "fundamental fairness" in informal rulemaking. 24 2 As these
pronouncements moved from dicta, to directives limited to specific
factual situations, to more general pronouncements, the understanding emerged that the informal rulemaking procedures of the APA
might be regarded as only a "floor." Depending on the nature of the
issues involved, the stakes, and the probable value of greater formality, agencies would be expected to employ procedures that moved
closer to the adjudicatory model rather than the legislative model.
The emergence of this "procedural review" was controversial,
and an intramural dispute soon erupted among the judges of the D.C.
Circuit over how courts should best implement a strategy of heightened scrutiny of rulemaking in order to insure the openness and integrity of the process. At one extreme stood Judge Bazelon, who argued
that, at least in cases involving scientific uncertainty, courts should
forego "substantive" review altogether and simply review the decision
to see if procedures of sufficient formality were followed to illuminate
the underlying controversies. 243 At the other extreme (on this debate
only) stood Judge Wright, who argued that courts should stick to the
procedural requirements and substantive review standards of the
APA, but should apply them in an aggressive way so as to "open the
agencies to outside information, challenge, and scrutiny. '2 44 In the
middle was Judge Leventhal, who thought that additional procedures
might be useful in some cases but who also endorsed a standard of
236 (1973) (formal rulemaking not required for setting rates unless the statute specifies that the
proceeding is to be held "on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing").
242. For an analysis of the progression of the case law in the D.C. Circuit, see Antonin
Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REV.
345.
243. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied 426 U.S. 941 (1976)
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring); David L. Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REV.817, 822-24 (1977).
244. Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process, supra note 94, at 397.
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review that would ask whether the agency had taken a "hard look" at
245
the contending submissions about disputed issues of fact and policy.
One way to view the Supreme Court's decision in Vermont Yan246
kee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,Inc.
is that it resolved this intramural dispute over what kind of common
law response to the emergence of widespread rulemaking was appropriate. In the decision under review, Judge Bazelon had applied his
idiosyncratic ideas about procedural review to a Nuclear Regulatory
Commission ("NRC") rulemaking proceeding that dealt with the environmental hazards of long term nuclear waste disposal. 247 He found
that the procedures followed by the NRC-the APA minimum plus
oral presentation-were inadequate. In a sharply worded opinion by
Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed. Rehnquist seemed at times to characterize the APA as compromise legislation that had fixed the procedural requirements for informal
rulemaking once and for all. 248 These passages suggest that it was illegitimate for reviewing courts to go beyond the bare-bones procedural
requirements laid down in 1946. On the other hand, the opinion also
appeared to endorse the approach of Judge Tamm's concurring opinion in the court below, 249 which was a species of hard look review.
And Rehnquist cited with approval a law review article by Judge
25 0
Wright that advocated vigorous judicial review of rulemaking.
After some hesitation, the D.C. Circuit and other lower courts
read these mixed signals as precluding "procedural review," but not
foreclosing reviewing courts from insisting that agencies take a "hard
look" at the factual underpinnings of the rule and alternatives to the
proposed action suggested by the parties. The commitment to transforming agencies through more intensive judicial review was simply
too strong in 1978 to allow the Supreme Court in one sharply worded
opinion to turn the tide. On the whole, therefore, Vermont Yankee
should not be regarded as marking the end of the capture era; it was at
most an early harbinger of the end.
245. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 69 (concurring opinion); see Harold Leventhal, Environmental
Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 511-12 (1974); Greater
Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 929
(1971) (Leventhal, J.).
246. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
247. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
248. E.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 523, 545-46 (1978).
249. Id. at 549.
250. Id. at 547 n.20.

1997]

CAPTURE THEORY AND THE COURTS: 1967-1983

This assessment is confirmed by the fact that the Supreme Court
itself eventually endorsed the new hard look idea, although it came
rather late in the day. Shortly after the Reagan Administration took
office, newly appointed officers of the National Highway Traffic Administrative rescinded a mandatory air bag rule promulgated by the
outgoing Carter Administration. In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers' Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,251 the
Supreme Court intimated that the decision fwas a product of industry
capture:
For nearly a decade, the automobile industry waged the regulatory
equivalent of war against the airbag and lost-the inflatable restraint was proven sufficiently effective. Now the automobile industry has decided to employ a seatbelt system which will not meet the
safety objectives of [the prior standard]. This hardly constitutes
cause to revoke the Standard itself. Indeed, the Act was necessary
because 252
the industry was not sufficiently responsive to safety
concerns.
Following the lead of the D.C. Circuit, the Court held that the
cure for this type of pathology was to impose a very strict reasongiving requirement on the agency. The agency would have to explain
in detail why the mandatory rule was rescinded, and why other possibilities like automatic seatbelts were not considered. Vermont Yankee was not inconsistent with such a requirement, the Court
explained, because the Court was not dictating "specific procedures;"
it was simply calling for more and better explanations, pursuit to the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of review. Judge Wright's strategy for dealing with capture through review of rulemaking was thus
2 53
fully and officially vindicated.
Since 1983, however, the idea of hard look review has gradually
withered on the vine. The Supreme Court has invoked State Farm to
reverse an agency action only once, in 1986.254 Since then, the decision has been cited only sporadically by the Court, usually for the
proposition that agencies are allowed to change their minds as long as
they give reasons for doing so. 255 In effect, the State Farm approach to
review of agency action has been largely superseded by the Chevron
251. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
252. Id. at 49 (citation omitted).
253. See also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654-55 (1990) (explaining why Vermont Yankee does not foreclose a heightened reason-giving requirement under
the arbitrary and capricious standard).
254. Bowen v. American Hospital Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 626-29 (1986).
255. See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank, 116 S. Ct. 1730, 1734 (1996); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
186-87 (1991).
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doctrine. The Supreme Court's administrative law docket consists
largely of Chevron decisions, and they turn on statutory interpretation, not an examination of agency procedures or reason-giving. 256
The pattern is less pronounced in the lower courts, but the same general trend is unmistakable. 257
There is no logical reason why this should be so: the Court could
easily fold the hard look idea of State Farm into the second step of the
Chevron analysis, giving content to what it means to adopt a reasonable interpretation of a statute.2 58 The reason State Farm has
atrophied while Chevron has flourished must be sought not in logic
but in changes in the underlying conception of the administrative
state. Hard look review presupposes that one agency of government-the agency-can be redeemed by having another agency of
government-the courts-engage in more intrusive review of its decisions. Once the faith in a radical asymmetry in the decisionmaking
qualities of these institutions starts to fade, so does enthusiasm for the
hard look doctrine. In fact, as the public choice understanding
spreads, and courts begin to perceive interest groups all around them,
they begin to harbor serious doubts about whether more intrusive judicial review designed to assure adequate representation of all views
in the administrative process is enough to rescue big government from
the charges of interest group dominance. In this environment, a conception of the legal function that allows courts to retreat into an
apolitical, lawfinding function (i.e., the Chevron doctrine) has much
greater relative appeal than one that seems to inject them in the middle of the policymaking process (State Farm's hard look review).
3. Due Process Hearing Rights
A third line of cases bearing on the scope of review concerns
whether the Due Process Clause mandates an adjudicatory hearing in
administrative contexts where either no hearings or more informal
hearings have been prescribed by statute. During the first period, the
answer to this question was framed by the rights-privilege distinction.
256. A LEXIS search reveals that Chevron has been cited by the Supreme Court in 107
subsequent cases, State Farm in 21.
257. A LEXIS search indicates that the D.C. Circuit has cited Chevron in 687 cases, and has
cited State Farm in 284.
258. See Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedureand Process: Agency Duties of Explanationfor
Legal conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313 (1996); Levin, supra note 202; Mark Seidenfeld, A
Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REv. 83 (1994).
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In Bailey v. Richardson,25 9 for example, the D.C. Circuit held that a
federal public employee dismissed because of concerns about her loyalty was not entitled to a pre-termination hearing because public employment was a privilege, not a right. The case law of the era by no
means uniformly rejected due process claims, and courts often found
some way to require a hearing even where the entitlement would have
traditionally been regarded as a "privilege. '260 Nevertheless, the general rights-privilege framework operated to deny due process claims in
many cases.
Then in 1970 the Court decided Goldberg v. Kelly, 26 1 and the due
process revolution was launched. As the Court soon announced,
Goldberg "fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between
'rights' and 'privileges' that once seemed to govern the applicability of
procedural due process rights. '262 Freed of its doctrinal shackles, the
Court proceeded to recognize a right to a hearing in a variety of contexts previously left to administrative discretion. In the span of only a
few years, the Court legislated minimal hearing procedures for terminated welfare beneficiaries, revocations of parole or probation, loss of
public employment, suspension of a driver's license, suspension and
discipline of students, and prison discipline. 2 63 As Judge J. Henry
Friendly observed at the time, "we have witnessed a greater expansion
of procedural due process in the last five years than in the entire pe'264
riod since ratification of the Constitution.
In Mathews v. Eldridge,265 the Court endorsed the use of a judicial balancing test for determining what procedures are required in
any given context by due process. This test is extremely open-ended,
and allows the courts freely to substitute their judgment for that of the
legislature or the agency as to whether pre- or post-termination hearings are required, and at what level of procedural formality. Indeed,
the Court specifically rejected the argument that the procedures specified by the legislature serve to define the nature of the property or

259. 182 F.2d 46, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1950), affd by an equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
260. See, e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Slochower v. Board of
Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
261. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
262. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972).
263. See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES, supra note 167, at 242-60 (summarizing thirteen Supreme Court decisions since 1970 covering these subjects).
264. Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1273 (1975).
265. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1039

liberty interest at stake, and hence must be considered in the due pro266
cess analysis.

The third period has not witnessed any major repudiation of the
due process revolution launched in Goldberg. As in other areas of
administrative law, however, further expansion of the range of interests protected by due process has been almost completely halted. In

general, the Court has become far more protective of common law
"liberty" or "property" interests than it has been of "new liberty" or
"new property" interests. 267 In those cases where due process protections for "new" liberty or property are recognized, it is usually because the interests are indistinguishable from those given due process
protection in the 1970s. 268 And in one frequently litigated areaprison discipline-there has been a significant retrenchment, with the
Court disavowing the analysis of earlier cases and holding that prison
regulations will be regarded as creating a protected liberty interest
only if they involve measures that impose "atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life."

26 9

All in all, one could say that the Court has implicitly differenti-

ated between interests protected at common law and interests that
used to be called "privileges," and that it has afforded a much greater
measure of de facto protection to the former than the latter. The old
rights-privileges doctrine has quietly returned, although it has not
been acknowledged as such.
Where the Court has found a protected interest, it continues to
use the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test.2 70 But there are signs of
266. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134 (1974).
267. In cases involving common law liberty or property interests, the Court has frequently
invalidated statutory or regulatory procedures on due process grounds. See United States v.
James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993) (forfeiture of real estate); Connecticut v.
Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991) (prejudgment attachment of real estate); Bums v. United States, 501
U.S. 129 (1991) (longer prison sentence than indicated by Sentencing Guidelines); Zinermon v.
Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (commitment of mentally ill without prior determination of competence to agree to commitment); Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252 (1987) (employer's right to terminate employee for cause). On the other hand, the Court has tended to
uphold statutory or regulatory procedures in which new liberty or new property interests were
involved. See Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995) (prison discipline); Kentucky Dep't of
Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454 (1989) (prison visitation privileges); Walters v. National
Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) (veterans' benefits).
268. See, e.g., Young v. Harper, 117 S. Ct. 1148 (1997) ("pre-parole" program indistinguishable from parole program deemed to trigger due process in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972), also protected by due process).
269. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
270. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Homar, 117 S. Ct. 1807 (1997); James Daniel Good Real Property,
510 U.S. 43; Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993); Doehr, 501 U.S. 1; Brock, 481 U.S. 252.
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unease with the open-ended judicial discretion conferred by the test.
For example, the Court has carved out significant areas of due process
inquiry where the Mathews test does not apply, including criminal law
and military law.27 1 Where a due process violation is found, often it is
on the basis of other precedent that allows the Court to pretermit any
balancing of interests under Mathews.27 2 And when the Mathews test
is applied, the result usually gives significant deference to the procedures prescribed by legislatures and agencies. 273 One gets the impression that the Court is not especially enthusiastic about the Mathews
test, even though it is probably too well-established at this point to be
overruled.
Although the Golderg v. Kelly revolution and its aftermath follow
the same general pattern as we see in other areas of administrative
law, in one sense the due process cases represent a departure from my
general thesis. There is very little rhetoric in the Goldberg line of
cases suggesting that the Court was concerned in the 1967-1983 period
with agency capture. Rather, the rhetorical focus was on the individual rights perspective-the importance to the individual of the underlying administrative determination and whether the individual interest
was outweighed by some countervailing governmental concern. And
if there is any academic influence entitled to credit for Goldberg and
its progeny, it would seem to be Charles Reich's articles on the "new
property" that were cited by the Court in Goldberg.274 Those articles
are not grounded in capture theory, but rather in Reich's idiosyncratic
ideas about how the administrative state has become a new type of
feudalism, requiring an expanded notion of private property to protect the individual from state oppression.
At a somewhat broader level, however, there is no doubt that the
Goldberg revolution was fueled by a perception of agency pathology.
To be sure, it was a different pathology than the one emphasized in
most other regulatory contexts. Borrowing the terminology of Neil
Komesar, the traditional administrative law questions were dominated
271. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (military law); Medina v. California, 505
U.S. 437, 446 (1992) (criminal law).
272. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996) (invalidating statute requiring prepayment of costs for appeal of decision terminating parental rights); Burns v. United States, 501
U.S. 129 (1991) (invalidating upward departure from Sentencing Guidelines without notice).
273. See, e.g., Heller, 509 U.S. 312 (applying Mathews and upholding Kentucky statutory
procedures for commitment of the mentally retarded); Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation
Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) (applying Mathews and upholding $10 limit on counsel fees in
Veterans Benefit proceedings).
274. Charles A. Reich, IndividualRights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74
YALE L.J. 1245 (1965); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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by concern with "minoritarian bias"-capture of agencies by well-organized groups representing parochial interests at odds with the public
purposes reflected in the statutory scheme. 275 In the due process line
of cases, however, the courts were concerned with "majoritarian
bias"-the possibility that agencies would ignore the interests and
needs of unpopular and poorly represented groups whose well-being
was a matter of no concern to the general public.2 76 In both instances,
however, revolutionary changes occurred in administrative law for the
same general reason: agencies were seen as being afflicted with
pathologies whereas courts were not. And in both instances, the
bloom on the revolution quickly faded once courts came to doubt the
stark dichotomized view that pictured agencies as uniquely
problematic.
C. Antitrust Immunities
Although one step removed from the history of the APA, the
subject of antitrust immunities is also highly instructive in assessing
changes in the judicial attitude toward the administrative state in the
last fifty years. The issue arises in three settings: the Parker v.
Brown 2 77 state action immunity; various implied federal immunities;278 and the Noerr-Penningtonimmunity. 2 79 Each of these immunities is a product of judicial lawmaking, and the scope of each turns to a
large degree on the judicial attitude toward the relative desirability of
agency regulation of economic activity as opposed to judicial liability
rules. Thus, each serves as an interesting barometer of the judicial
attitude about the relative competence of agencies as opposed to
courts. If my historical thesis is correct, changes over time in the common law of antitrust immunities should mirror changes we see in administrative law doctrine.
In the interest of economy, I will concentrate here on the state
action immunity, because it has the largest body of Supreme Court
cases. But I believe similar patterns could be shown under the federal
immunities and the Noerr-Penningtoncase law.
275. KOMESAR, supra note 43, at 56.
276. Id. at 57.
277. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
278. See 9 EARL W. KINTNER & JOSEPH P. BAUER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 31, 77, 144
(1997) (discussing public utilities, communications, and securities industry immunities).
279. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965); Eastern R.R.
Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135 (1961).
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The state action immunity stems from the decision in Parker v.
Brown, which dates from about the same time as the APA. Parker
spoke in sweeping terms: the Court stated that nothing in the Sherman Act restrains state action or state officials engaged in activities
directed by the state legislature; the Act was designed to control
"business combinations," not state governments. 2 80 The Court thus
upheld a California statute that in effect established a state-supervised
cartel among raisin producers.
As John Wiley has written, Parker was a product of the Depression and of "the existing intellectual climate."'28 1 In that climate
[tlhe nation's faith in competition was at its nadir; its hope in the
promise of economic regulation was at its zenith ....Regulation
was viewed both as essential to a working economy and as a victory
of public interest over private advantage-the very defining characteristic of a progressive era ....In this intellectual climate, Parker's
states' rights premise that federal courts should keep their preemptive hands off state
legislated regulation must have seemed blind2 82
ingly self-evident.
Not surprisingly, relatively few antitrust preemption cases arose during the next twenty years, the general assumption being that Parker
had settled the matter for most purposes in favor of state
2 83
regulation.
This assumption began to shift in the 1970s. In a series of decisions starting with Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,284 the Court adopted
a narrow reading of Parker,and ruled that various types of price fixing
undertaken under the auspices of state institutions were subject to the
Sherman Act. 285 These decisions caused the Court to recast the Parker
doctrine in 1980: henceforth state regulations would be shielded from
federal preemption only if their anticompetitive policy is "clearly ar286
ticulated" and "actively supervised" by the state.
As Wiley has persuasively argued, the dramatic narrowing of the
Parker doctrine in the 1970s and early 1980s can be attributed to the
rise of capture theory:
280. 317 U.S. at 350-51.
281. Wiley, supra note 71, at 718.
282. Id. at 718-19.
283. But see Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951) (liquor price
affirmation statute not authorized by Miller-Tydings Act preempted by federal antitrust laws).
284. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
285. See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Cantor
v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
286. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980).
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[T]he shift in doctrine toward wider application of federal antitrust
policy fits well with the evolution of broader social attitudes during
the same period. Regulation, formerly conceived of as a method of
advancing public interest over private advantage, in many instances
came to be conceived of as a method of subsidizing private interests
at the expense of the public good ....

[T]his change in intellectual

climate caused the Court to perceive state regulatory287policy from a
different perspective than that of the Parker Court.
And indeed, although the two criteria reflected in the Court's
new doctrine are otherwise puzzling to antitrust scholars, 28 8 they make
sense from the perspective of a simplistic version of capture theory.
Vague delegations to agencies are often thought to facilitate capture;
hence requiring that the anticompetitive policy be "clearly articulated" will make it less likely that the policy reflects the preferences of
a narrow interest group. 2 89 Another common warning sign of capture
is where government regulatory authority is delegated to private
groups; the "active supervision" requirement can be seen as opening
this type of statute up to antitrust scrutiny.
In the mid-1980s, the Court's attitude to antitrust preemption
again perceptibly changed, as its decisions "mark[ed] a shift toward
greater availability of the 'state action' defense. ' 290 In Town of Hallie
v. City of Eau Claire,291 for example, the Court distinguished cases in
which the actor is a private party acting pursuant to state policy and
cases in which the actor is a municipality. The Court held that the
"active supervision" requirement does not apply to the latter class of
cases, nor is it necessary to show that the State compelled the munici292
pality to act.
Although some of the Court's rhetoric in Hallie seemed to
harken back to the public interest era,2 93 more recent decisions which
have continued the process of retrenchment have sounded themes
consistent with the public choice conception. Most prominently, in
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 294 the Court rejected a

"conspiracy exception" to the Parkerdoctrine, even if limited to cases
287. Wiley, supra note 71, at 723.
288. See id. at 729; Spitzer, supra note 113, at 1298.
289. See William H. Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown
in the Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987 DUKE L.J. 618, 640-42; Spitzer, supra note 113, at
1308-09.
290. 10 EARL W. KINTNER & JOSEPH P. BAUER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 141 (1994).
291. 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
292. Id. at 38-47.
293. "We may presume, absent a showing to the contrary, that the municipality acts in the
public interest. A private party, on the other hand, may be presumed to be acting primarily on
how or her own behalf." Id. at 45 (citations omitted).
294. 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
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where public officials are found by the jury to have taken "corrupt or
bad faith decisions. '29 5 The Court explained:
Few governmental actions are immune from the charge that they
are 'not in the public interest' or in some sense 'corrupt.' The California marketing scheme at issue in Parker itself, for example, can
readily be viewed as the result of a 'conspiracy' to put the 'private'
interest of the State's raisin growers above the 'public' interest of
the State's consumers. The fact is that virtually all regulation benefits some segments of society and harms others; and that it is not
universally considered contrary to the public good if the net economic loss to the losers exceeds the net economic gain to the winners. Parker was not written in ignorance of the reality that
determination of 'the public interest' in the manifold areas of government regulation entails not merely economic and mathematical
analysis but value judgment, and it was not meant296to shift that judgment from elected officials to judges and juries.
Here, we see in starkest form the influence of the public choice
conception of the administrative state. It makes no sense to tailor
legal doctrines to try to mitigate the effects of interest group capture,
because interest group influence is ubiquitous. The only refuge is to
fashion legal doctrine in accordance with the traditional concept of
separation of powers. Courts can do no more than enforce the rules
as written, and thereby protect their own claim to be oracles of the
law. Whether the law makes sense or conduces to justice is someone
else's problem.
D.

ConstitutionalFramework

The administrative state has always existed in tension with the
framework of government established by the Constitution. The framers of that document did not contemplate a federal government of
scale and scope of the one we have today. Nevertheless, it has been
settled since the late 1930s that the administrative state and the Constitution can co-exist. In reviewing some of the constitutional developments of the last fifty years, it is clear that there have been no
transformative changes in this basic understanding; the administrative
state is here to stay. Still, it is possible to detect shifts in constitutional
understanding that provide some confirmation for the historical thesis
being advanced here.

295. Id. at 374-79.
296. Id. at 377.
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1. The Nondelegation Doctrine
The Court has reaffirmed many times that Congress may not
delegate the "legislative powers" conferred by Article I to some other
entity. 297 This understanding, if taken seriously, would call into question the constitutionality of any delegation of power to promulgate
legislative rules or otherwise make policy having binding effect on the
public. For better or worse, however, this understanding has not been
taken seriously. Instead, the Court has held that Congress may delegate broad policymaking discretion to nonlegislative bodies as long as
it lays down an "intelligible principle" that guides the exercise of such
discretion. 298 Only if Congress were to delegate broad rulemaking or
policymaking power to an agency without any such an intelligible
principle would this-in theory at least-violate the so-called
"nondelegation doctrine. '299
Given my hypothesis concerning the evolution of judicial views
about the administrative state, one might predict the following pattern
of implementation of the nondelegation doctrine in the last fifty years.
During the first or public interest era, one would expect little or no
enforcement of the doctrine. James Landis, in his paean to government by agency experts, characterized separation of powers doctrine
as an anachronism; 300 in an era that largely concurred in this assessment, one would not expect to see robust enforcement of a principle
that might inhibit the granting of broad discretionary powers to
agencies.
With the coming of the capture period, one would expect to witness a revival of the nondelegation doctrine. If agencies are prone to
capture, but the legislature is not, then one might see an improvement
in the quality of public policy if critical policy decisions were made by
Congress, and agencies were reined in so as to make capture harder to
30 1
achieve.
As we move into the third period, characterized by a loss of faith
in all forms of activist government, one might predict that interest in
the nondelegation doctrine would again subside. The public choice
297. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692
(1892); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825); The Cargo of the Brig Aurora v.
United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 388-89 (1813).
298. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
299. The Court has enforced the intelligible principle requirement only twice, in both cases
in striking down New Deal era legislation. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
300. LANDIS, supra note 35, at 1-5, 47-48.
301. See Lowi, supra note 28, at 155.
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perspective yields no clear preference for legislative policymaking relative to agency policymaking; thus, there would be no obvious im-

provement in social welfare from enforcing a vigorous nondelegation
requirement.
The pattern of decided cases more-or-less conforms to these predictions. In the period 1946-1966, the nondelegation doctrine reached
its all time nadir. Although the Court continued to mouth the "intelligible principle" requirement, fair minded observers at the time had to
concede that in a number of cases it would be more accurate to say
that the Court upheld statutes which contained no principle at all.30 2

During the capture theory phase, interest in the nondelegation
doctrine began to perk up. An early and influential decision by Judge

Leventhal suggested that the separation of powers foundation for the
intelligible principle requirement could be dispensed with, leaving a
kind of all-purpose anti-vagueness doctrine. 30 3 Although this suggestion did not ultimately catch on, it did succeed in associating the

nondelegation doctrine with the dominant concern of the time-the
need for greater control of unfettered agency discretion.
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court in two cases said it would

interpret regulatory statutes narrowly in order to avoid nondelegation
questions, which the Court implied should be taken seriously. 30 4 In
one of these cases and a follow-on case raising a similar issue, Justice

Rehnquist, joined the second time around by Chief Justice Burger,
actually voted to invalidate a provision of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act on nondelegation grounds. 30 5 Two highly respected judges

on the D.C. Circuit weighed in with law review articles urging that the
nondelegation doctrine be taken more seriously. 30 6 Highly esteemed
constitutional law scholars agreed. 307
302. See DAVIS, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note 240, at 87-94; Louis Jaffe, An

Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power: 11, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 568-78 (1947).
303. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C.
1971). See also Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713
(1969) (arguing that delegation doctrine be reformulated as a general requirement that administrative discretion be governed by legal standards); Harold Leventhal, Principled Fairness and
Regulatory Urgency, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 66, 70 (1974) ("The contemporary approach is
one not of invalidating even the broadest statutory delegations of power, but of assuring that
they are accompanied by adequate controls on subsequent administrative behavior").
304. Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607, 646
(1980); National Cable Television Ass'n. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974).
305. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.
dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.); Industrial Union Dept. (Benzene), 448 U.S. at 671-88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
306. Carl McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
1119, 1166, 1174 (1977); Wright, Beyond DiscretionaryJustice, supra note 97, passim.
307. JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 131-34 (1980).
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To be sure, this boomlet of interest never went so far as actually
to yield a decision invalidating a statute on nondelegation grounds.
The key problem may have been that a majority of the Court was
wary of reviving a doctrine that had no easily implemented operational principles. Still, it cannot be gainsaid that the doctrine suddenly
regained a degree of legitimacy, and was taken far more seriously than
was the case in the early years under the APA.
By the early 1980s, there were signs that legal academic sentiment
was again beginning to shift. Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler
published an influential study of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977 arguing that broad delegations might produce better policy than
highly detailed statutes, because agencies may be less prone to capture
than is Congress. 30 8 Jerry Mashaw also wrote a more theoretical article challenging the conventional wisdom that a revived nondelegation
30 9
doctrine would result in less capture.
Whether directly influenced by this change in academic sentiment
or not, when a new series of nondelegation cases eventually came
before the Court in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the challenge
was overwhelmingly rejected in each case. 3 10 Only in the first decision, Mistretta v. United States,311 which upheld the delegation of authority to the Sentencing Commission to develop federal sentencing
guidelines, did Justice Scalia issue a lone dissent. Thereafter, both he
and Chief Justice Rehnquist-who had briefly urged greater enforcement of the doctrine in the early 1980s-acquiesced in relatively perfunctory analyses of whether Congress in each case had legislated a
sufficient "intelligible principle" to overcome the nondelegation challenge. 3 12 Today, it is clear that no revival of the nondelegation doctrine is imminent. Although there is no direct evidence that public
choice theory has influenced this shift back in the direction of the attitude of the 1950s, 313 the shift is at least consistent with the eclipse of
capture theory as a dominating influence on the courts.

308. ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 35, at 123-24.
309. Mashaw, supra note 128.
310. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165-66 (1991). Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline
Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1989); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-74 (1989).
311. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
312. Touby, 500 U.S. at 165; Skinner, 490 U.S. at 218-220.
313. Legal academic sentiment, however, continues to include voices expressing strenuous
support for revival of the doctrine. See, e.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993).
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2.

Presidential Removal Power

A second constitutional question of abiding significance for the
administrative state concerns whether, or to what extent, Congress
can create administrative entities that operate independently of presidential control and oversight. When the APA was adopted, the issue
was framed by two landmark decisions concerning the President's
power to dismiss subordinate employees at will. Myers v. United
States314 held that a statute purporting to require the President to seek
the advice and consent of the Senate before dismissing a local postmaster was unconstitutional, given that the "executive power" and the
duty to "take care" that the laws be faithfully executed were vested
exclusively in the President. 3 15 Humphrey's Executor v. United
States,3 16 in contrast, upheld a statute giving Federal Trade Commissioners fixed terms in office and requiring a presidential finding of
cause to support a dismissal before the end of a term. Myers was distinguished on the ground that the FTC exercised "quasi-legislative"
and "quasi-judicial" powers, unlike the purely "executive" power exercised by the postmaster in Myers.317 Together, Humphrey's Executor and Myers suggested that independent regulatory agencies are
constitutional, at least insofar as they do not exercise purely executive
functions.
What might one expect of the fate of this understanding, given
the three different understandings of the administrative state I have
outlined? During the first era, obviously one would expect to see further evisceration of Myers and an expansion or reaffirmation of the
notion that the Constitution does not stand in the way of the creation
of a fourth branch of government. This follows directly from the postulate that insulation of agencies from political oversight and interference is necessary in order to promote the public interest.
The implications of capture theory are much less clear. Capture
theory was mistrustful of agency independence, but sought a solution
primarily through judicially imposed procedural reforms. However, at
least some commentators influenced by capture theory also advocated
enhanced presidential oversight as a potential solution to the prob-

314.
315.
316.
317.

272 U.S. 52 (1926).
Id. at 163-64.
295 U.S. 602 (1935).
Id. at 626-32.
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lem. 318 To the extent this viewpoint was assimilated by courts, it
might result in a tilt back in the direction of Myers.
Public choice theory would appear to harbor considerable sympathy for presidential control of independent agencies. One theme of
public choice-influenced scholarship is that the unitary executive is
more likely to resist interest group pressures than is a multi-member
Congress, because the President tends to be held accountable for the
overall performance of the economy. 319 For example, public choiceinfluenced scholars have tended to favor vigorous OMB review of regulatory initiatives of independent agencies, 320 and integrating the independent agencies more thoroughly into the Executive Branch. 32 1
When we examine the leading cases, we find a degree of support
for these predictions. The one prominent decision of the first era,
Wiener v. United States,322 takes the process of eviscerating Myers a
step beyond Humprhey's Executor. The Court held that a commissioner of an Article I war claims tribunal could not be removed by
President Eisenhower without a showing of cause. 323 The Court
reached this conclusion even though the statute creating the commission (unlike the Federal Trade Commission Act in Humphrey's Executor) was silent on the question of removal. 324 In effect, the Court
created a presumption that an agency engaged in adjudicatory as opposed to purely executive functions should be independent of political
oversight. Independence was presumed to be a good thing.
The capture theory era produced no major decisions concerning
the presidential power of removal. The most important precedent for
the issue of presidential control was Buckley v. Valeo,325 which invalidated a provision of the Federal Election Act providing that the appointment of members of the Federal Election Commission was to be
divided among the President, the President pro tem of the Senate, and
the Speaker of the House. The Court held that the commissioners
were "Officers" of the United States, and hence had to be appointed
318. See Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the PoliticalProcess, 84 YALE
L.J. 1395, 1414-17 (1975).
319. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK.
L. REV. 23, 99-102 (1995). The Court's emphasis in Chevron on the greater political accountability of agencies because they are subject to Presidential control reinforced these arguments.
320. See Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986).

321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

See Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 41.
357 U.S. 349 (1958).
Id. at 356.
Id. at 352.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 326 It is
difficult to know what significance to read into this decision; the violation of the Appointments Clause seems quite plain and possibly would
have been identified by virtually any court. 327 Note, however, that the
provision dividing the appointment authority among three powerful
political leaders could be viewed as a kind of recipe for capture of the
FEC by political insiders. 32 8 It is thus perhaps not too far-fetched to
see the invalidation of the appointments provision as reflecting the
general concerns of the capture theory era.
In contrast to the general dormancy of separation of powers concerns during the first two eras, the public choice era has been characterized by a sharp revival of judicial concern with separation of
powers ideas. The period opened with the landmark decision in INS
v. Chadha,32 9 invalidating the legislative veto of administrative action.
Chadha seemed to signal a new attitude of rectitude on the part of the
Court about preserving the original constitutional structure. As Justice White complained in his dissent, the majority opinion seemed intent on interpreting the Constitution as if the administrative state did
not exist. 330 If the Court was going to insist on preserving the original
constitutional structure, then it would seem that the idea of a "fourth
branch" of government consisting of independent agencies might be
vulnerable to constitutional challenge.
The question came to the fore in Bowsher v. Synar.3 31 At issue
were provisions of the Gramm-Rudman Act which authorized the
Comptroller General, generally regarded as a legislative officer, to
certify the need for certain spending reductions, which the President
was then obligated to implement. 332 The district court held that the
statute violated the Myers principle-it required the Comptroller
General to perform a purely executive act but the Comptroller General was not subject to dismissal by the President. 333 The Supreme
Court, however, invalidated the statute on the different ground that it
represented an impermissible aggrandizement of congressional
326. Id. at 140-41.
327. Except for the D.C. Circuit, which had rejected the Appointments Clause challenge in
the decision below. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 888-96 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc).
328. This factor did not escape mention by the Court. 424 U.S. at 134.
329. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
330. Id. at 984 (White, J., dissenting).
331. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
332. See id. at 717-19.
333. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1403 (D.D.C. 1986).
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power. 3 34 Thus, the Court avoided any ruling that might have called
into question the constitutionality of the independent agencies.
The question of the continuing validity of Myers could not be
avoided in Morrison v. Olson,3 3 5 however. The circumstances could
hardly have been less auspicious for a broad ruling supporting executive power. At issue was the constitutionality of the independent
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act. Invalidation
would have meant that the President and top executive branch officials could be investigated for wrongdoing only by officials subject to
dismissal at will by the President. Not surprisingly, the Court drew
back from endorsing any such result. Moreover, the Court disavowed
the understanding, which had been widely accepted since the decision
in Humphrey's Executor, that the President's removal power turns on
whether the agent is performing purely executive as opposed to
"quasi-legislative" or "quasi-judicial" functions. 336 The "real question," the Court said, "is whether the removal restrictions are of such
a nature that they impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty, and the functions of the officials in question must be
33 7
analyzed in that light."
The Court thus discarded Myers' categorical rule that all executive officers must be subject to dismissal at the will of the President.
The decision in Morrison therefore effectively put an end to the effort
to overrule Humphrey's Executor, and bring the independent agencies
within direct presidential control.
It would be a mistake to read too much into the Court's decision
in Morrison, however, and in particular to conclude that public choice
ideas have had no impact on decisions regarding constitutional structure. When we step back from the two issues that have the most direct bearing on the constitutional status of administrative agenciesthe nondelegation doctrine and the presidential removal cases-we
can see in the broader sweep of recent constitutional rulings much
greater support for the proposition that the Court is disenchanted
with the modern administrative state.
3.

Recent Trends in Constitutional Law

One indication of this is the line of decisions dealing with attempts by Congress to influence policy without adhering to the pre334.
335.
336.
337.

See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726-27, see id. at 760-61 (White, J., dissenting).
487 U.S. 654 (1988).
Id. at 689-91.
Id. at 691.
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sentment and bicameralism requirements of Article I, Section 7. The
Court has consistently struck down attempts by Congress to "aggrandize" its powers in this manner. 338 These decisions betray a deep suspicion of the legislative branch-and arguably of activist government
more generally-and thus betray a very different attitude than that
found in either the public interest or capture theory periods.
Another indication is the dramatic revival of federalism as a constitutional value. The Court has struck down legislation on the ground
that it exceeds Congress' power under the Commerce Clause;339 it has

recognized a new non-text-based limitation on the power of Congress
to commandeer state legislatures and state executive officials; 340 it has

refused to permit Congress to legislate under the authority of Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment when this would intrude more
1
deeply into local authority than the Court itself is prepared to go;3 4 it
has held that Congress has no power under Article I to abrogate state
sovereign immunity from suit in federal court; 342 and it has recognized
a variety of clear statement rules and other constructional principles
designed to minimize federal intrusion into state affairs. 343 Although
not directly concerned with administrative agencies, these decisions
cumulatively reflect an intense suspicion of broad federal governmental power. As such, they are consistent with a more general anti-governmental attitude, such as one would expect to find in a public
choice-influenced era.
A third indication is the enhanced status and protection given to
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 344 The Takings Clause is
especially significant because it acts both as a brake on the expansion
of governmental power, and as a symbolic reaffirmation of the importance and value of private property rights. The Court's new takings
jurisprudence is thus also consistent with what one would expect to
see in an era characterized by general suspicion of government and
preference for the market over government as an instrument of social
organization.
338. See Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991); Bowsher, 478 U.S. 714; Chadha, 462 U.S. 919.
339. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
340. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992).
341. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997).
342. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
343. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcraft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
344. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
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Summary

The foregoing tour d'horizon of administrative law doctrine is
necessarily superficial, and omits many important doctrines and details. But enough has been said, I think, at least to sustain the proposition that broad developments in administrative law in the last fifty
years are consistent with the three-stage development in judicial ideology I have hypothesized. Admittedly, "consistent with" does not
prove caused by, and it is possible that some other explanation is
available that is more parsimonious or provides a better fit with the
data. It is also possible that my description of the relevant beliefs is
either too narrow or too broad. I will happily revise my views when a
better theory comes along.
The survey of judicial doctrine also suggests the need for a few
clarifications or refinements in the original hypothesis. The posited
causal connection between capture theory and the jurisprudence of
1967-1983 seems on the whole better demonstrated than the connection between public choice theory and the jurisprudence of 1983 to the
present. My own view is that this is because the anti-governmental
attitude associated with the public choice perspective yields few clear
conclusions about what judges should do in administrative law cases.
But it could also be that the public choice perspective is less securely
or universally embraced by the judiciary than capture theory was in
the middle period, resulting in a greater degree of variation in judicial
behavior.
The survey also suggests that in terms of doctrinal development,
the break between public interest theory and capture theory circa
1967 is sharper than that between capture theory and public choice
circa 1983. The fact that Vermont Yankee (repudiating a capture theory innovation) was decided in 1978 and State Farm (endorsing a capture theory innovation) was decided in 1983 highlights the point that,
at the very least, the doctrinal response was in flux over a period of
years. This too may suggest a greater degree of underlying ambivalence in judicial attitude-at least for a significant stretch of time from
the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s-than my original hypothesis
presupposes.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS/PROGNOSTICATIONS

I have argued in this paper that ideas matter, and in particular
that ideas about the nature of the administrative state matter to judges
as they tinker with the common law of the administrative process.
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The general insight is not new, of course, nor is its application to administrative law. James Q. Wilson, for example, came to a similar
conclusion after reviewing the state of administrative law at the
threshold of the Reagan era: "[W]e must be struck at every turn by
the importance of ideas. Regulation itself is such an idea; deregulation is another . . .To the extent [that] an agency can choose, its
choices will be importantly shaped by what its executives learned in
'34 5
college a decade or two earlier.
Nevertheless, although others have previously explored the relationship between political ideas and administrative practice, with the
passage of time some things become perceptible that were only dimly
seen in the past. Thus, I believe it is worth revisiting the historical
record in an effort to discern lines of influence. I do not pretend to
have offered the last word on the subject, and invite others to develop
alternative characterizations or hypotheses that explain more data or
provide a better fit with the data that I have presented.
If the argument advanced here about the importance of ideas like
capture theory and public choice theory is correct, if only approximately, then it has a number of implications for the future of administrative law and for scholars and teachers of administrative law. One
thing to note is that although I have focused on the influence of political ideas on judicial doctrine, this is not the only, or perhaps even the
most important, influence that political ideology may have on administrative law. Wilson, with the example of Alfred Kahn at the Civil
Aeronautics Board before him, 34 6 thought that changing political
ideas would have the greatest impact on agencies themselves as they
formulate policy within the discretion left them by Congress. 347 In
this, he may be right. Certainly today there are other examples of
agencies initiating far-reaching changes-such as the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission's efforts to bring competition to the natural
gas and electric power industries-which are obviously shaped by
ideas and are likely to have far-reaching impacts on society well beyond anything that will come about because of the Chevron doctrine.
345. James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in TIHE POLITICS OF REGULATION 393
(James Q. Wilson ed., 1980). Wilson's comments echo those of Lord Keynes, who also warned
about "[madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, . .. distilling their frenzy from some
academic scribbler of a few years back." JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF
EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY

346.

383 (1936).

See Bradley Behrman, Civil Aeronautics Board, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION,

supra note 345, at 75 (noting "[flew regulatory agencies-if any-have ever altered their policies
as rapidly or radically as did the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) between 1974 and 1978.").
347. Wilson, supra note 345, at 393; see also Aman, supra note 31, at 1105 (also noting that
agencies frequently took the lead in promoting deregulation during the 1980s).
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In addition to their impact on agencies, ideas about regulation
obviously affect decisionmakers in Congress and the White House as
well. In this regard, Keith Werhan has recently written an interesting
article arguing that we are witnessing a general movement toward the
"delegalization" of administrative law. 348 He includes within this
characterization the Clinton Administration's continuation of centralized review of regulations by the White House's Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") under a cost-benefit standard, the
endorsement by Vice President Al Gore's National Performance Review ("NPR") of market mechanisms over command and control regulation, the NPR's advocacy of negotiated rulemaking over traditional
notice-and-comment procedures, and its support for alternative dispute resolution in place of traditional adversary adjudication by agencies. 349 He notes that these proposals share in common a preference
for decentralized, voluntary, contractual solutions to public problems,
350
as opposed to centralized, legislated, compulsory solutions.
Werhan does not relate this program of reform to public choice
ideas, but it is not too difficult to see a connection. If all political
institutions fail or are prone to failure, then perhaps the solution is to
get government out of the way altogether, or at least to adopt mechanisms that produce decisions that mimic the outcomes a decentralized
market would reach. If the public choice conception of the administrative state is now driving a general program of delegalization, this
could have a far greater impact on administrative law than the occasional Supreme Court decision on standing. This again underscores
the importance of remembering that changes in political ideas affect
administrative law in a pervasive way that goes well beyond changes
in judicial doctrine.
What then about the future of administrative law? Our little excursion into the history of ideas suggests that if one thing is constant,
it is that ideas about the administrative state change. Thus, it would
be a grave mistake to think that the public choice paradigm that is
currently ascendent is here to stay. What will take its place is anybody's guess. Perhaps public choice will evolve into something differ3 51
ent, call it the "new institutionalism" or "positive political theory,"
which adopts a more interactive view of political institutions, and is
348.
349.
350.
351.

Keith Werhan, Delegalizing Administrative Law, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 423.
Id. at 429-41.
Id. at 440-41.
See Rodriguez, supra note 29, at 138-49.
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less despairing about politics because it starts with lower expectations.
But I have no crystal ball.
Indeed, the story of the relatively sudden rise of capture theory in
the late 1960s, and the more gradual but equally important spread of
public choice ideas in the 1980s, suggests that an administrative law
professor is one of the last persons one should consult about the future of administrative law. An administrative law professor is someone who makes a living dissecting and commenting on judicial
opinions that discuss the role of the courts in reviewing agency action.
Such a person's reputation is based on a capital stock of knowledge
grounded in the past. Not uncommonly, the organizing principles
such a person will use to comprehend this information will also be
grounded in political controversies of the past. A legal scholar is thus
unlikely to detect a change in the political wind until it has manifested
itself in multiple Supreme Court decisions. By then, the shooting will
be over, and it is not unlikely that some new change in political thinking will be brewing.
Consider in this light Judge Friendly's lectures in 1962352 or Louis
Jaffe's Judicial Control of Administrative Action 353 published in 1965.
Both are immensely learned, sophisticated, nuanced analyses of the
then-contemporary administrative law. But neither had a clue that
administrative law was about to undergo a fundamental transformation. Or think of the legal literature of the early 1980s celebrating the
hard look doctrine, and urging its use to slow down the pace of deregulation. 354 One would never guess from reading this literature that
hard look review was about to be displaced as the central mechanism
of judicial oversight by the Chevron doctrine with its focus on narrowly conceived statutory interpretation. I am not faulting these writers for failing to be clairvoyant; the point rather is that legal scholars
should not be expected (and should not try) to be clairvoyant, because
they have, if anything, a comparative disadvantage in seeing the future. If one wants to predict the future of administrative law, the
place to start is not to ask a law professor but to examine the reading
lists for introductory political science courses at the better colleges.
Which brings me to my final thought: if law professors are not
very good at engineering changes in administrative law, or in predicting changes in administrative law, what ought they be doing? The
352. See FRIENDLY, supra note 51.
353. See JAFFE, supra note 78.

354. See, e.g., Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505
(1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulationand the Hard Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 177.
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short answer is that they should play to their strength, which is studying and teaching about legal doctrine. Even if administrative law
evolves in response to changes in political ideas, it does so against a
backdrop of doctrine into which the changes must be integrated. The
lawyer's task is to perform the integration, so that the changes sought
and resisted by others can take place (or not take place) within a process we call law. New generations of lawyers need to be taught about
the doctrinal conventions that govern different fields of law, such as
administrative law. And administrative law professors can perform a
service to the profession, the judiciary, and the agencies by synthesizing pockets of doctrine and pointing out the potentialities for move355
ment in different directions.
In addition to studying and teaching doctrine, I think there is also
a role for studying the history of administrative law, including the relationship between political ideas and administrative law doctrine. If
lawyers and law professors can do little to influence the future, at least
it may be helpful for their students to have some understanding about
what factors do influence judges and administrators, gleaned from a
study of the past. Indeed, I am not at all sure that the effect of studying the relationship between law and political ideas would make students (who include in their number future agency administrators and
judges) more "political. '356 It might have exactly the opposite effect:
understanding how judges and administrators are influenced by political ideas, often in ways that seem silly or misguided in retrospect,
may make students less enthusiastic about using legal arguments to
achieve social reforms. 357 At the very least, it should make students
less naive about the law, and hence more effective lawyers on behalf
of their clients.
The one thing I think we could use less of from administrative law
scholars is normative advice-giving on a grand scale. Proposals from
law professors to transform administrative law so as to conform with
some fashionable normative vision probably fall on deaf ears, if only
because they are written after the wellsprings of judicial behavior
355. Ron Levin's article for this symposium is an admirable example of the kind of scholarship administrative law professors should be doing. Levin, supra note 202.
356. After all, the ascendancy of legal realism in the 1920s and 1930s-which taught that law
was politics-was followed by a period of judicial passivism; the ascendancy of the Legal Process
school in the 1950s and 1960s-which taught the need for law to be principled-was followed by
Warren Court activism.
357. For some reflections along these lines, directed to the behavior of Supreme Court Justices, see Thomas W. Merrill, A Modest Proposal for a Political Court, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 137 (1994).
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have already been fixed. Indeed, these exercises can have unintended
consequences, as when a smorgasbord of proposals to combat the
(perceived) public choice tendencies of the administrative state end
up communicating nothing but the message that the administrative
state is most plausibly described by public choice theory. It is not surprising that law professors are tempted to play God (or at least a
preacher of the gospel), lecturing to empty pews about how the world
ought to ordered. But it is a temptation to be resisted.

